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Summary  
This report demonstrates that the existence of significant economies of scale and scope in the 
European gas industry make many transmission and local distribution companies natural 
monopolies in the markets in which they operate. Often, this gives them a strong market power 
and little competitive pressure. Substantial parts of the rent in the gas chain are accrued in the 
transportation segment rather than in production and/or to the benefit of consumers. This gives 
reason for public interventions into the functioning of the market, as seen under the initiatives 
taken by the European Commission, such as the “Gas Directive”.  
 
The report discusses gas transport regulations; arrangements that goes beyond the present EU 
initiatives.  No schedule seems to secure any first-best outcome. However, different types of 
multipart tariffs and price discrimination under Ramsey principles may bring about social 
acceptable second-best results. The complexity of regulations and the huge interests at stake 
make it doubtful that such regulations are attainable throughout Europe in the coming decade. 
The report discusses a game between a public authority and the transporters where various level 
of conflict and cooperation will influence how far regulations will go and how they will be 
designed. Changing property rights (nationalization) and the use of market forces is discussed as 
alternatives to regulation.  
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Introduction 
 To understand the behavior of natural gas markets, one has to understand the economics 
of gas transportation. Gas production look a lot like oil production, and gas competes with oil 
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and other fuels in end-user markets. Transportation costs for gas, however, is much higher than 
for oil. When investments in transmission, distribution and storage facilities are made, most costs 
of transportation are fixed. Variable costs for operation and maintenance, are usually relatively 
low compared to capital costs. Thus, the use of the pipeline, or the load factor1, does not 
influence total cost of transportation much.2 When capital (investment) is fixed, and, within 
certain limits, even operational costs remains unchanged when volume transported changes, a 
higher or lower load factor change per unit transportation cost, but not total cost.  
 
 Often, the benefits of large-scale operations and vertical integration in gas transportation 
effectively make barrier to entry for newcomers prohibitive. This contributes in making markets 
for natural gas transportation highly concentrated with few actors involved.3 Often, operations in 
the industry are either taken hand of by firms owned by, or they are private firms facing strong 
regulations from, governments.  
 
 The argument behind various forms for public intervention in the operation of natural 
monopoly transport utilities is that if they are allowed to behave as profit maximizers, without 
constraints, consumers and overall economic efficiency will suffer. By intervening into the 
functioning of the market, governments wish to repair for market failures created by dominating 
private enterprises. Inefficient operation and possible opportunistic behavior among monopolistic 
firms, together with externalities in the use of gas as an important source of energy, the 
environment, concerns over economic activity, rent distribution, reduced dependency on Middle 
East oil and lack of information throughout the gas chain, have justified government 
intervention.  
 
 This report discusses why public intervention into the behavior of natural gas 
transportation may be needed also in Europe and analyses techniques for how it could be done. 
Chapter 1 recalls some basic characteristics of competitive and monopoly markets. Then, it 
defines a natural monopoly as a firm that inhibits significant economies of scale and/or scope in 
                                                 
    1 The percentage use of capacity, relative to maximum, or peak, capacity. 
    2 The IEA (1994), page 49, argues that "operation and maintenance cost of pipelines, excluding compressors are fixed costs; estimates for them 
as an annual proportion of construction costs are in the region of 2 % onshore and 1 % offshore". They estimate maintenance costs for 
compressor stations to "run about 3-6 % of investment cost per year of operation at a relatively high load factor".  
    3 Among additional factors determining the routing, choice of dimension, installment of compressor stations of pipelines and building of 
storage facilities, are distance between producing and consuming areas, seasonal and daily variations in demand, Europe's physical and political 
geography, and various commercial and political actors' strategies.  
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relation to market size. The chapter also discusses where natural monopolies typically are found 
in the European gas market, as well as limits to natural monopoly gas firms' overall market 
power. Chapter 2 discusses reasons for public intervention into these types of imperfect markets, 
what criteria should be used in order to maximize social welfare and the instruments at hand for 
policy-makers.  
 
 Chapter 3 discusses some of the most commonly used techniques for regulating the 
behavior of natural monopolies, such as rate-of-return regulation, price discrimination, the use of 
subsides and the multipart tariffs. How optimal capacity and prices in a transmission system 
should be determined when demand varies is discussed, as well. Chapter 4 presents a game 
between the regulator and a transporter under the threat of being regulated. The question is 
whether and/or when the (potentially) regulated firm benefit from an interplay with the regulator 
and when it benefits from just opposing any intervention from public authorities. Finally, in 
chapter 5, changing property rights (nationalization) and the use of market forces is discussed as 
alternatives to regulation. 
 
1. Natural Monopoly 
 
Competitive and Monopoly Equilibrium’s 
 As demonstrated in any microeconomic textbook, for competition to work, many profits 
maximizing companies must offer a good or service on the supply side. No firm should hold a 
dominant market position, everyone should be free to establish or close down a business and no 
externalities should be present. Correspondingly, on the demand side, there must be many 
consumers, each maximizing utility. Producers' and consumers' goals are attained if the good or 
service is priced at the point where the marginal willingness to pay (WTP) equals marginal cost 
of production. This also gives the largest social surplus.  
 
 Under perfect competition, equilibrium is determined by the intersection of market 
demand and supply curves. At demand D0 and supply S0, this intersection determines market 
price po and output qo, as shown in graph A in figure 1. Each seller is assumed to have marginal 
cost (MC) and average cost (AC) curves defined for all possible outputs. Prices must be equal to 
or above average total cost (ATC) (the sum of average variable cost, AVC, and average fixed 
cost, AFC), to make the firm stay in business (normal profit is included in cost curves as an 
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opportunity cost).4 In graph B in figure 1, a single firm produces output q0* at market prices p0 at 
minimum ATC (assuming identical cost curves for all firms). This is the long run equilibrium 
under perfect competition where each firm is earning normal profit, but no economic profit. If 
AVC < p < ATC firms will stay in business but only in the short run. In the long run, prices 
must cover fixed costs, as well. 
 
p
p0
q0
S0
D0
qmarket
(A) market
p
p0
q0*
qfirm
(B) firm
MC
ATC
AVC
Figure 1: Short and long run equilibrium under perfect competition
 
 If market demand increases, price increases, as well, and each firm will earn an economic 
profit. This economic profit will attract more firms into the business, which over time will push 
market supply curve to the right and prices back down to p0. Without any change in cost curves, 
each firm will remain at producing output q0* in the long run, but the number of firms has 
increased as the size of the market has grown. Similarly, a negative shift in demand will decrease 
market prices and force those firms not able to cut costs out of business. In perfectly competitive 
markets, no firm will earn economic profit in the long run, only normal profit. Supply and 
demand conditions will dynamically change output, prices and the number of firms in a way, 
which is optimal also for society.  
 
 The other extreme market situation is monopoly, with only one active seller. There may 
be 'inactive' sellers willing to enter the market, for example before a monopoly are constructed as 
                                                 
    4 Normal profit is the opportunity cost of being in business, or what you could have earned in your next best alternative activity. This is the 
minimum return to the owners of the capital employed, for them not to close down the business and move to another activity or simply putting the 
money into the bank. It is a cost, just as wages, rent et.c., because it has to be covered if the firm shall continue producing. Therefore, normal 
profit is usually included in the cost curves. Economic profit, or rent, is, on the other hand, the excess of profit over normal profit. It is known 
under several alternative names: supernormal profit, pure profit, abnormal profit, positive profit, producer's surplus and sometimes simply profit. 
The reasons for earning economic profit can be many, and have led to more names to be employed for the same: 'Quasi rent' may be earned when 
supply is rather inelastic so that firms being in business earn a rent over some time until other firms manage to enter the market. This is the 
normal situation in most markets; 'Monopoly rent' may be earned if there is a strong consentration of market power on the supply side; 'Resource 
rent' may be earned if the product is an exhaustible resource such as oil and gas et.c.  
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a cartel. If a firm has a higher ATC than the cartel members at the possible level of output, this 
firm is not producing at competitive prices. But as soon as the cartel is established and prices are 
raised, possibly to a level above this firm's ATC, it can enter the business as a 'free rider'. In this 
case, the cartel must take such companies' behavior into account, just as sellers in an oligopoly 
market must consider the behavior of other active and inactive sellers in their strategy. Without 
inactive sellers in the market, the monopolist is free to determine price and output in a way that 
profits is maximized. This happens when marginal costs equal marginal revenue (MR) as shown 
in figure 2.  
MC
ATC
D (average revenue)
qq0
MR
qmon
F
D
BA
C
E
pmon
p0
AC
p
Figure 2: Profit maximization under monopoly
 
 
 For a price taking firm marginal revenue equals price determined in the market (MR=p0). 
Profit is maximized where the firm's marginal cost equals marginal revenue (MC=MR=p0). For 
a monopolistic "price making" firm, marginal revenue declines with output. The monopolist is 
only constrained by the demand curve, as a higher price lower quantity demanded. For this firm, 
profit is also maximized when the firm's marginal revenue equals marginal cost, which now 
happens at a lower volume (MC=MR<p0), at point F in figure 2. Profit is maximized at output 
qmon and prices set to pmon. The area ABDC represents the economic profit gained by the 
monopoly. As consumers' marginal willingness to pay is higher than producers' marginal cost of 
production at q0 < q < qmon, there is a welfare loss represented by the area BEF.  
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 In addition to the efficiency loss due to monopolistic pricing, monopolies may also incur 
X- inefficiency or allocative inefficiency: When there is no competitive pressure on profit 
margins, cost control may become lax. The result may be overstaffing and spending on prestige 
buildings and equipment, as well as less effort to introduce new technology, scrap old plants, 
develop new products and markets. The more comfortable the situation, the less may be the 
effort expended to improve it. The effect is that cost-curves are pushed higher and low quality 
products are provided at increasingly higher prices. Because of the excessive pricing practice and 
inferior efficiency, governments generally prohibit cartels, stimulate competition and intervene 
into the behavior of monopolies in order to repair for the welfare losses.  
 
Natural Monopoly 
 
 A natural monopoly is a type of monopoly that exists when it is less costly to satisfy 
demand with only one company operating in the market than for two or more firms. The 
monopoly is in this sense 'natural'. However, it is not necessarily optimal if the firm abuses it's 
monopolistic market power and/or allocate inefficiency. Without public intervention, such 
firms may behave as monopolists without much fear of competitors entering the market, rise 
prices excessively and serve increasingly more inferior products with inefficient use of 
resources. Natural monopolies can arise when there are economies of scale and/or scope in the 
production of goods or services. Economies of scale exist when it is less costly for one firm to 
produce a single commodity than it is for two or more firms. Economies of scope exist when 
one firm can produce two goods or services at a lower total cost than if independent firms 
produced each of them.  
 
Economies of Scale 
 In the very long run, all costs can be considered variable and fixed costs are zero. In most 
cases, however, depending on what is considered to be short and long run, some costs are fixed, 
and total costs of production consist of fixed plus variable costs. Whenever there are fixed costs, 
average cost must be falling for output levels close to zero and rising with larger quantities of 
output. Large fixed costs are the most prevalent source of economies of scale. The fixed costs 
must be incurred no matter how many units of output are produced. In figure 3, average costs are 
falling up to output q0 and rising thereafter. This plant has economies of scale at q < q0 and 
diseconomies of scale at q > q0.  
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q0
q
economies of scale diseconomies of scale
p
Average cost
Figure 3: Average costs and economies of scale
 
 This is the general form of an ATC curve. The difference between a plant usually said to 
be having economies of scale and a competitive firm is that q0, or cost minimum, occurs at high 
output levels compared to market demand. When there are economies of scale for a sufficient 
part of the production compared to demand the firm becomes a natural monopoly in producing 
this product. Thus, for two transmissions companies having identical cost functions, one of them 
can operate as a natural monopoly, while the other may face some degree of competition. The 
difference is that demand in the second market is larger than in the first, and large enough so that 
the economies of scale are exhausted. Figure 4 illustrates this in more detail. 
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Figure 4: Relation of average cost to demand
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 Graph A shows a situation where average cost decreases over the entire scale of 
operation to the left of the demand curve, Da. Let the average cost of producing output q be 
expressed by the function c(q). Decreasing average costs can be expressed as: 
 
(i) c(qi)/qi > c(qj)/qj        (where qj > qi)
 
 This is the most usual expression for economies of scale and secures that one firm can 
produce the good at the lowest cost. However, this is not a necessary condition for economies of 
scale to exist. 
 
 In graph B, the demand curve Db intersects the average cost curve within the area of 
diseconomies of scale at q=q1>q0. Average cost are falling at outputs q<q0, but are increasing 
for q>q0. Let average cost of producing q1 be c(q1). If two firms share the market equal, so that 
each produces 0.5q1, average cost for each will be c(0.5q1) > c(q1) (assuming identical cost 
functions for both firms). An uneven division of the market would give different average costs, 
but the sum of costs would still be larger than c(q1) and the firm would operate as a natural 
monopoly due to economies of scale. 
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 The fact that the firm is a natural monopoly also for outputs q0<q<q1 is explained by the 
term subadditivity. A cost function is subadditive at q if and only if: 
 
m             m
 m
(ii) c(Σ qi ) ≤ Σ c(qi)  for all quantities of q1, q2, ...,qm  where Σ qi = q.
  i=1           i=1 i=1
 This condition is necessary and sufficient for costs to be lowest when one firm operate 
the market. In a more compact form, the condition for subadditivity for output q1 can be written 
as: 
(iii) c(q1)  <  c(q) + c(q1 - q)  for  0 < q < q1
 If q1 is the largest possible demand in the industry (where demand curve intersect the 
ATC curve) and inequality (ii) or (iii) holds, then c(q1) is strictly subadditive and the industry is a 
natural monopoly. Thus, a cost function can be subadditive even if there are substantial 
diseconomies of scale at the actual level of output. A firm that has decreasing average costs 
across the scale is called a strong natural monopoly and satisfies function (i). If it only satisfies 
function (ii) or (iii), it is called a weak natural monopoly (Berg & Tschirhart, 1988: 24).  
 
 If demand compared to cost should be as high as Dc in figure C, two companies can 
produce 2q0 at a lower cost than one firm. If one firm should produce all output, it would to so at 
a higher average cost, as c(2q0) > 2*c(q0). The market turns into a natural duopoly (or perhaps 
oligopoly, if demand is even larger). If demand is really large as compared to the efficient scale 
of operation, as illustrated by Dd in figure 4 graph D, firms are facing a competitive market. 
Then, we are back to the situation with a number of firms (N) all producing q0, as illustrated in 
figure 1. 
 
 Sunk cost is closely related to fixed cost. Sunk cost can be defined as the difference 
between the ex ante opportunity cost and the value that could be recovered ex post after a 
commitment to a given project has been made. Thus, the larger part of a project's fixed costs 
that are sunk cost the stronger the natural monopoly. 
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Economies of Scope 
 Costs can also be saved when one firm is producing more than one service. Even though 
each segment of an industry produces a unique type of output, companies may "bundle" services 
in order to save cost. When efficient bundling of services takes place, within each segment and 
across the gas chain, it is due to economies of scope. For example, a producer can search for gas, 
drill and run a gas field. The transmission company can, next to transporting the gas, also 
function as a broker and wholesaler and offer storage for its customers. Production and 
transmission may more efficiently be organized when planned together than independently. 
Local distribution companies can, besides distributing gas to households and businesses, offer 
storage, equipment for end-users and advice.  
 
 The existence of scope economies indicates that gas companies’ bundling services may 
have competitive advantages over companies operating unbundled. Teece (1990) argues that 
benefits from joint operation of successive operations may occur if there are:  
• Informational efficiencies, where one firm may better know the bottle-necks in 
transportation, producers' opportunities and limitations, customers demand situation etc. than 
if operations are split to more firms.  
• Operating efficiencies including pressure controls, rerouting of gas during maintenance work 
etc. Since gas leaves and enters many stages on the way from producer to end-user, (many 
of) these operations may better be dealt with under one management rather than many.  
• Aggregation economies that is achieved if one supplier, better than two, can match demand 
from different customers. The economic and political costs of failing to supply or purchase 
are great.  
 
 By bringing the decision processes under the management of a single firm or under 
coordination between firms, greater security and stability of supplies to the market can be 
provided, when short-term supply disruptions are costly and rapid access to alternative 
supplies is inhibited or impossible. With one management, or explicit coordination between 
two or more managements, gas firms such as a transmission company may become more 
credible if they have aggregated customers and suppliers to match changes. By integrating 
vertically a firm may also avoid opportunistic behavior from parties earlier or later in the gas 
chain. Centralized managements may handle vertically linked processes more easily than 
through market transactions. Signing contracts may be time-consuming and costly and 
hamper a firm's ability to produce efficiently. If overall profit is the goal, rather than 
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maximum profit in each segment, one firm may easier give an efficient solution than two may 
or more firms may.  
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Figure 6: Diseconomies of scope
 When economies of scope 
exist, the factors of production will be 
used in a way that two or more 
services can be produced at lower costs 
than when produced separately. Let’s 
assume that the average unit cost of 
producing two goods or services, x and 
y, can be expressed by the function 
c(x,y). In figure 5, c(x,y) is drawn by 
the U-shaped area showing the cost of 
production at every combination of x 
and y. At point 1, quantities x1 and y1, 
are produced at total cost of c(x1,y1). If 
one company produces only x and 
none of good y, the costs for this single 
product would be c(x1,0). Similarly, if 
a company where to produce only y and none of x, it's cost function would be c(0,y1). The total 
cost of producing x and y separately would be c(x1,0) + c(0,y1) > c(x1,y1). Thus, it costs less if 
one company instead of dividing the 
production between two or more 
produces x1 and y1. Economies of 
scope exist if c(x,y) < c(x,0) + c(0,y) 
and minimum costs for combinations 
of x and y are incurred along the u-
shaped curve.  
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Figure 5: Economies of scope
 
 Figure 6 illustrates, on the 
other hand, a situation with 
diseconomies of scope. In this 
situation, any co-production of x and 
 Lillehammer college: Research report no 53, 
y will lead to higher costs than if production were separated and executed by independent 
companies; c(x,y) > c(x,0) + c(0,y). 
 
 If a natural monopoly bundles services due to scope economics, many combinations of x 
and y can make it earn an economic profit. A gas producer may i.e. run a normal profit, or even a 
loss, on a petro-chemical plant, but obtain economic profit in the transmission system they 
operate. Then, prices are cross-subsidizing each other. Equivalently, a transmission company 
could run a broker- and wholesaler function with normal profits, while the transportation 
function is run with an economic profit, and vice versa.  
 
 Economies or diseconomies of scope may occur with or without economies of scale. Cost 
may be saved for one firm by producing both services at small volumes, but not at large volumes 
even if the economies of scale are present all the time and vice versa. For the company, the 
optimal mix of production will also be determined by how economies and diseconomies of scale 
and scope are distributed compared to demand. This will also determine whether a single plant 
and/or a firm producing more than one output is a natural monopoly or not. 
  
Natural Monopolies in the European Gas Market 
 The existence of economies of scale is a pressure to create firms that are relatively large 
compared to the markets in which they operate. Smaller firms may integrate horizontally and 
merge together into larger and more efficient firms. The situation for the European gas market is 
illustrated in figure 7.  
 
 The four main supplying countries (Norway, Russia, Algeria and the Netherlands) 
compete in selling gas. Often, producers have advantage of large-scale operations. However, 
even if each gas field may produce most cheaply with one plant, and some of them are very 
large, there are many independent fields both on- and offshore supplying the European market. 
Generally, in today’s market, gas is sold from producers to the purchasing transmission 
companies at the border in point A, and resold from them after transmission to the local buyers in 
point B.  In each of the exporting countries, gas sales are done by one body or are orchestrated 
together (see discussion in Marbro & Wybrew Bond, 1999). This concentrated sales organization 
does not represent a by-nature wellhead monopoly across fields due to economies of scale. 
Producers supplying the European gas market have a greater potential for operating under some 
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degree of competition than the transportation segment does. Different fields of production could 
from a large-scale-benefit point-of-view, compete with each other within and across countries. 
On the other hand, there may be scope benefits between production, storage and transmission 
within the exporting countries that gives argument in favor of coordination. The question is 
whether the scope benefits are so large that bundling services gives the lowest overall costs in 
providing the services. 
 
Figur 7: Competition and monopolies in the European Gas market
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 The transmission systems, in producing as well as in the consuming countries, inhibit on 
the other hand, strong elements of natural monopoly. The purchasing monopsony that 
transmission networks in consuming countries to a large extent have obtained in Europe is 
created on the basis of by-nature natural monopolies. The position is reinforced in gas negations 
with producers through collaboration between the transmission networks. This by-nature strong 
position and cartelization towards the producers is reflected in the fact that the purchasing 
transmission companies generally have attained a monopolistic position towards their customers 
at the city-gate and towards power plants and large industrial users.  
 
 Each of the buyers of gas at the end of a transmission line is so small and geographically 
spread that they usually are unable to construct alternative routes for supply. Power plants and 
large industrial users are gas consumers themselves. The LDCs are, on the other hand, often 
monopolists in serving local consumers in households and businesses at its exit due to scale 
economies. In addition, they may have scope benefits in providing equipment for gas use etc. 
reinforcing their strong position in these end-user markets. On the other hand, integration 
Ole Gunnar Austvik: Economics of Natural Gas Transportation. Lillehammer college: Research report no 53, 
2000. 
between LDCs and pipelines seem to happen to a lesser extent. Probably, this is due to greater 
dissimilarities between the transmission and retailing business, than between production and 
transmission. Perhaps, integration between these is restrained by diseconomies of scope, 
reinforcing the more competitive structure across customers.  
  
 Thus, a public authority that wants to liberalize the market at all levels of the gas chain 
must, generally, seek to  
• establish competition between exporters,  
• regulate terms for access to producing and consuming countries transmission networks and 
storage,  
• enhance competition between the buyers (LDCs, power plants and the industry), and  
• regulate the behavior of the LDCs. 
This should all be done without destroying the benefits of bundling of services where scope 
economies exist.  
 
 Obviously, the “Gas directive” (EU, 1998) is not introducing a fully liberalized market 
per se (Austvik, 2000). Even though the directive addresses the transportation issue through 
the suggested Third Part Access (TPA) obligations, it does not address the entire gas chain 
from the gas field to the burner-tip, nor does it require specific terms for how transmission 
should operate. However, this report will not discuss this directive explicitly. Rather, our 
discussion will concentrate on how the transportation segment should be dealt with in a 
completely liberalized market for gas in Europe, beyond the present directive. 
 
Limits to Market Power 
 With significant economies of scale (and scope), transmission companies tend to become 
powerful towards producers as monopsonists, and towards customers as monopolists. As profit 
maximizers they have the potential of negotiating low prices to the producers/exporters and 
charge high prices and exploit any possible inelasticity of demand from their customers. An 
invoice from the transmission company to shippers (being producers or customers) can incur the 
cost of transportation, as common carriers, or implicitly as the difference between sales price to 
customers and the purchase price from producers, as private carriers.  
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 Private Carriage is transportation where the pipeline buys the gas from the producer for 
resale to local distribution companies, power plants or large industrial users. Contract Carriage, 
on the other hand, is transport of gas owned by others. Let the tariff (per unit price of 
transportation) for a private carrier of natural gas be denoted st. The difference between the price 
it pays for the gas from the producer (pp) and the price it receives from the distribution company 
(pd), is then st = pd - pp, which, disregarding all operational and investment costs and physical 
losses, equals its profit. A monopsonistic pipeline towards suppliers operating as merchant faces 
a price function that will increase with quantity (q) purchased from the producer. If the 
transmission company is the only purchaser, it will bid up the price paid to producers when 
increasing throughput, expressed as: 
(i) pp = pp(q), where  dpp(q)/dq = p' > 0
On the other hand, being a monopolist towards its customers, the price the transmission
company receives from them will decrease with increases in quantity sold:
(ii) pd = pd(q), where  dpd(q)/dq = d' < 0
The pipeline's profit (Π) will be:
(iii) π =  st * q  =  pd(q) * q   -   pp(q) * q
Setting the derivative of (iii) with respect to quantity to zero yields:
d π /dq  =   q * d'  +   pd    -   pp  -    q * p'    =    0
(iv) => pp   +   q * p'   =   pd   +   q * d'
 
 The left side of (iv) expresses the marginal cost of buying gas from the producers. The 
element q * p' tells us how much the price of gas to producers will increase if the pipeline buys 
an incremental unit. The right side of the equation expresses the marginal revenue of selling one 
additional unit of gas. The element q * d' tells us how much the price of gas to customers will 
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decrease if it sells one more unit of gas. Not surprisingly, the equation shows that at maximum 
profit, marginal revenue from selling an additional unit of gas shall equal its marginal cost. The 
special in this case is that the transmission company, by restricting quantity traded towards 
producers and distributors, power plants and large industrial users in this optimal manner, can 
simultaneously exploit inelasticities of demand and supply in order to maximize its own 
advantage. It is possible, but not likely, that such a situation, that in a stylistic way describes how 
the present European gas market is working, is socially efficient or maximizing public welfare. 
 
 However, several factors determine the transmission companies’ market power in 
addition to scale and scope economies. One such factor is the power of producers and customers, 
respectively, that the transporter meets at it end. By concentrating sellers and buyers power, a 
counterforce to mitigate pipelines' market power is created. In the European gas market, this is, 
to some extent, done at the supply side, which today better can be characterized as oligopolistic 
than competitive. There are only a few exporting nations, and within each of these nations gas 
sales are orchestrated through one body. At the customer’s side, however, it is more difficult to 
concentrate purchasing power. Customers are placed in several consuming countries and there 
are many LDCs, power plants and industrial users within each of them. Thus, on the customers’ 
side, the European and U.S. gas market is, from an economic point of view, more similar than on 
the supply side, where in the U.S. there are thousands of producers.  
 
 In order to exploit economies of scope, producers have good reasons to integrate wholly 
or partially with transmission activities. In the Norwegian North Sea, producing firms’ in most 
cases has property rights in offshore pipelines. In Russia and Algeria, it is (so far) done by 
centralized firm(s) in Moscow and Alger, planning production and transmission to the respective 
countries' borders. In the Netherlands, Gasunie buys all gas, transports it to the border and sells 
it. This product extension contributes in realizing the oligopolistic market structure on the supply 
side. In the market, the long-term contracts between producers and consuming countries’ 
transmission companies may also be considered as an approach to optimizing the advantages of 
joint management of transmission and production. 
 
 The market power of the transmission companies is also limited if there is an alternative 
route or method of transportation. Often, the building of another pipeline may incur too high 
costs to represent any credible threat to the existing one. LNG as an alternative to pipeline 
transportation, may, in some cases, put a limit on how high pipeline fees can be (intermodal 
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competition). Investment costs for LNG transportation are largely connected with liquefaction of 
gas (in producing countries) and regasification and storage (in consuming countries). Shipping 
costs between producing and consuming nations are some 50 % higher than for oil, but represent 
a much lower share of overall costs in bringing gas from producer to consumers than do gas 
pipelines. The distance of transportation plays a much smaller role in LNG transportation and 
there is no technical fixed relationship between producer and customers. "As a result, pipeline 
transportation costs for onshore distances over 4000 km and offshore distances over 2000 km 
generally exceed those of LNG where an offshore route of similar length is available" (IEA, 
1994: 55). Within the European continent, often pipelines provide the only feasible link to 
customers. However, gas from he Middle East, Nigeria and the Barents Sea, may prove to be 
more cost effectively transported to the European market as LNG than through pipelines. 
Transporting gas on lorries and trains, are not economically feasible with today's technology.  
 
 In end-user markets, competition from other fuels, in particular oil products, but also coal 
and nuclear electricity, provide a price cap on gas. To the degree that customers can switch 
quickly and cheaply between fuels when gas prices changes, LDCs monopoly power towards 
end-users are restricted by this interfuel competition. The prices of alternative energies represent 
the limit on total market turnover, and on how much rent the various segments of the gas chain 
can "fight over". Competition from substitute products (in the case of gas: electricity, coal and 
oil), makes demand more sensitive to price changes and, thus, restrict the degree of market 
power by sellers, but it usually does not eliminate it. 
 
 Taken together, with some modifications, the barriers to entry is significant in pipeline 
transportation and transmission companies have great potential of exercising market power both 
towards producers and towards customers. The potential for and benefits of market power, may 
lead to "over-bundling" of services and over-investment in capacity in order to deter 
newcomers.5  Even if it is not cost-saving advantages in bundling all kind of services, firms may 
nevertheless profit by doing so due to the benefits of increased market power. For a transmitter, 
for example, there may be economies of scale in transportation of gas but not necessarily 
economies of scope in the role as a wholesaler. The broker role may in some cases inhibit 
elements of economies of scope with the transmission service and in other situations independent 
firms could do it more efficiently. By having the exclusive rights (natural monopoly) in the 
                                                 
    5 See Broadman (1986) for a discussion of market power in the U.S. natural gas pipeline industry. 
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transmission function, the pipeline company has the power to prohibit other companies wanting 
to act as brokers, take over their potential profit and obtain a monopoly in providing merchant 
services, as well. This will contain the contact between producers and end-users and decrease 
market efficiency. While the pipeline gains, there may be a net loss for society.  
 
2. Public Interests 
 The problem for policy makers wanting to liberalize the market is that it’s concentrated 
structure may also be the socially most efficient one, in spite of its inferiority. Because of scale 
economies, more firms operating in the market may incur higher transportation costs unless the 
market grows sufficiently in each geographic segment. This argument goes for product extension 
through vertical (or horizontal) integration and the exploitation of economies of scope, as well. 
Thus, the challenge for governments is to intervene in a way that preserve a market structure that 
have the potential to minimize cost, and at the same time change its behavior in order to avoid 
possible lax cost control and exploitation of market power. 
 
 One important question is how large the benefits of vertical integration and coordination 
is. The existence of scope advantages indicates that liberalization of the market should open for 
the possibility to bundle services in competition with provision of unbundled services. The 
smaller the market and fewer the number of players, the less cost arguments seem to be in favor 
of unbundling operations. If operations are unbundled and there exist economies of scope, the 
gain from increased competition should be weighed against the losses of less efficient operations 
of each firm. Thus, with the growth in the European market, gradually more arguments support 
the idea of unbundling.  
 
Maximizing Social Welfare 
 The significant scale economy in trunk pipelines, sunk investments and capital 
immobility, possible economies of scope in vertical integration and companies' bundling of 
services influences vertical and horizontal ownership relations and contractual terms in the 
European gas market. In specific segments of the markets, these relationships may promote 
efficient investments and pricing without public interference, but the strong concentration of 
market power indicates that this is rather the exception than the rule. Possibly high and rigid 
prices paid for transportation may lead to under-investment in production, as an overly large part 
of the market price ultimately paid for natural gas is accrued in the transportation sector rather 
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than by producers. Similarly, high or rigid prices to distribution companies may lead them to 
exploit their strong position towards consumers (over time restrained by the price of the 
alternatives to gas), making consumption of natural gas sub-optimal. Gas is fairly non-polluting 
and, thus, inhibits a positive externality for the environment relative to the use of other fossil 
fuels. The view from the EU (EU, 1988) is that a too rigid market structure may be harmful for 
the economies involved, both from an environmental, efficiency and security-of-supply point of 
view. 
 
 The transmission systems are integrated parts of the gas market that should balance in 
competing demand for transportation services, optimal resource management and risk 
evaluations. From a social point of view, it is important that the economies of scale and scope 
is exploited, but at the same time that market inequities caused by extensive pipeline 
concentration and excessive bundling by transmission companies are neutralized. An optimal 
gas grid should enhance security of supply for consumers as well as security of demand for 
producers. The system should secure flexibility both in a static and dynamic sense. Statically 
by creating a variety of arrangements suiting each actor. Dynamically, by permitting arrange-
ments to evolve gradually based upon market trends rather than through radical change every 
few years. These goals are sometimes complementary and sometimes conflicting. Ideally, the 
grid should barely figure into the producers' production decisions and the consumers' choice 
of energies.  
 
 A regulatory regime that aims at optimizing the transporters’ behavior should look for 
arrangements that do not primarily place this judgement upon public policy makers. If one 
could find self-regulative arrangements, the chances that the system contains the necessary 
dynamics when market conditions alter are better. This is also important in order to impose 
minimal administrative costs. Even if a possible regulation may yield a socially efficient 
outcome, the costs of the enforcement process need to be subtracted from the benefits 
achieved by regulation, and compared to the costs of operating the existing system, in order to 
appraise the net social benefits. In the U.S., conditions under which gas could be produced 
and transported have repeatedly led to undesired results. After some time, some of the 
regulations was removed and new regulations introduced, but only after having incurred 
considerable judicial and regulatory costs, loss of efficiency and social welfare (Austvik, 
2000: chapter 6). 
 
 An additional argument in favor of self-regulative arrangements is that the regulator over 
time need not necessarily seek to maximize social wealth only. A regulatory agency may begin 
its existence with public interest in mind, but end up as an agency to protect producers and/or 
pipeline companies. The persons employed in the regulatory agency may be influenced by his or 
hers career opportunities, political motives, self-assertion, power, etc. The regulated companies 
can gain control over the regulator and trap or capture the regulator to act in their interest and 
influence the goals that the regulator sets and the way he/she seeks to attain them. Such 
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"capturing" can be encouraged by the movement of personnel between regulatory agencies and 
the firms, which may increase the desire for cooperation and making close ties between them. 
 
 Regulatory policy that involves transfer of huge sums from a large group to a small group 
is often lobbied for more easily by members of the small group. The small group has a lot at 
stake per capita, and easier to organize than a large group. Therefore, small groups are usually 
more successful in satisfying their demands towards public policy makers than large and often 
more diffuse groups. With huge interests at stake, producers, consumers, pipelines and 
distribution networks have good reasons to vociferously pursue their interests. Some countries 
and companies may be better off by exploiting a possible monopoly power in the market, even if 
it is not a zero-sum game in total. Usually consumers are associated with large groups and 
companies with small groups. Stiegler (1971) argues that public regulation therefore often leads 
to producer-protectionist results. Each party may also be too small to influence the situation and 
therefore does not consider the optimal situation even if they would be better off if it prevailed, 
and may stick to an existing sub-optimal situation. 
 
 Maximizing social welfare may, therefore, be an intriguing challenge. How to avoid 
inefficient bundling in the natural gas industry and keep, or even create, efficient bundling and 
exploitation of economies of scale and scope? How to prevent firms from taking unacceptable 
advantage of a possible strong positions in segments of the market? The correct answers to these 
questions will easily be viewed differently by competing parties, and these groups may pressure 
regulators. In order to design an efficient and welfare-maximizing way of regulating the market 
one needs a closer identification of the actual goal of the regulation.  
 
 Microeconomic theory is often used for this purpose, i.e. that the ideal situation exists in 
the market when price equals marginal cost (corrected for externalities). In perfectly competitive 
markets, there should be no need for public intervention (the first best solution). If one market 
failure arises, such as the existence of a cartel or of pollution, marginal social cost no longer 
equal marginal social benefit. In order to correct for this market failure, government should 
intervene to restore the first-best situation, where social benefits equal social costs. A first-best 
economy operates under conditions of social efficiency (Pareto optimality) and the policies 
introduced correct the market distortions that occur. 
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 However, in the real world, this is rarely possible. In a second-best economy, 
compromises between theoretical first-best solutions and the real market are adopted. The 
application of a second-best policy means to minimize the distortionary effects of the market. 
Policy measures, other than nationalization, generally aims at second-best solutions. In fact, one 
could argue that nationalization also is a second-best solution (at best), as it over time often does 
not satisfy social efficiency goals even if it's intended to do so. 
 
 Of course, effective public intervention needs to consider political, psychological, 
cultural, practical and other issues, in addition to the knowledge of economics. Seeking to 
practice a pure economic model within the real world, i.e. in constructing tariffs for gas 
transportation, may lead to other results than what should be expected. Economics may first 
of all give insight into the processes around and the purpose of regulation, describing 
important forces operating towards optimality. By understanding these forces, the regulator 
can use this insight together with other aspects to be taken into consideration, to improve 
welfare and market efficiency and move towards optimality, although not necessarily 
reaching it. 
 
Laissez-faire, Nationalization or Regulation?  
 To illustrate the situation we will start with a strong simplification of the position of a 
transmission company. Figure 8 considers a strong natural monopoly, due to economies of scale, 
with low (and constant) marginal costs compared to fixed costs. The position and shape of the 
demand curve (assumed linear and falling) determines which output-price combinations that are 
possible in this market. We will discuss three possible outcomes. In point A, the firm acts as a 
monopolist choosing a high price/low output combination. In point B, the firm acts as a 'cost-
plus' company where price is set equal to average cost. In point C, the firm produces an output so 
large that price must equal marginal cost in order to make consumers absorb the entire output. 
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Figure 8: Decreasing average cost in a pipeline; 
Monopoly vs. competition
  
 Point A: A monopolist would choose to produce where marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost, which happens at point X. The production (or the amount of transported gas) will be qmon. 
For this quantity, consumers are willing to pay the price, or tariff, denoted earlier as the share to 
transmission company, pmon. The company's economic profit will be GAEF, which results from 
the difference between market price and average costs at output qmon. If the company increased 
production beyond this point, marginal cost would be higher than marginal revenue and it would 
loose money on the margin.  
 
 Point C: If output increases beyond qmon, this would be more optimal from a social point 
of view. The willingness to pay is larger than the marginal cost all the way up to point C. Thus, 
point C is considered to be the socially most efficient way of production. The problem is that the 
price for transmission at point C, pmc is below average cost and the company looses money 
unless someone is willing to pay the deficit. The loss is represented by area HDCI, which is the 
difference between the market price and average costs times output qmc. The net advantage for 
society in moving production and prices from point A to point C is represented by area ACX.  
 
  Point B: If the company should break even, price must equal average cost. At point B an 
output of qac is produced at price pac, and the company earns normal profit but no economic 
profit. This point is also more optimal for society than the monopoly solution in point A.  The 
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gain for consumers (GABJ) is obviously larger than the loss for the producers (GAEF). Society's 
net gain equals area ABLX, while the deadweight loss is BCL compared to the first-best solution 
in C. Point B is a second-best-solution from a social point of view compared to point C. 
 
 Historically, nationalization (point C) has been widely applied in Europe after Word War 
II. Under nationalization, the government replaces the market by providing the service or good 
itself. When nationalized, the governmental owned company, usually, sets price equal to 
marginal cost. As long as average costs often exceed marginal cost for natural monopolies, 
public budgets must transfer funds to the firm to cover the deficit (HDCI). However, marginal 
cost pricing is a necessary, but not sufficient, criterion for maximizing social welfare, as it 
ignores the question of the 'best' or 'fairest' distribution of income. It may be possible to reach a 
higher level of welfare with an 'inefficient' way of production than with an efficient one. This 
could happen if the income distribution is 'sufficiently wrong' or if it is difficult to reach the most 
efficient way of producing. Then, it could be better to look for second-best solutions for how the 
goods or service should be provided.  
 
 Regulation (point B) is such a second-best solution and has been the American way of 
intervening into such markets. Public regulation may be made through force, or by incentives, 
inducing the firm to act in its self-interest, which at the same time is compatible with social 
goals. Under regulation, the goal is to make the firm decrease price/tariff, increase output and to 
produce this output efficiently at minimum cost. The firm must earn normal profits on its 
investments in order to remain in business, but no economic profit. However, this simple goal is 
not that simple to reach.  
 
 Often laws about market structure and firms behavior are parts of a liberalization of a 
market. Laws may prohibit or regulate the behavior of firms that are imposing external costs. 
For example, a firm can be banned or restricted to perform polluting activities. In the case of 
monopolies and oligopolies, laws can be used to change the structure of the industry or the 
behavior of the firms within it. When affecting market structure, laws can make mergers 
(horizontal integration) illegal. Even though there may be a large number of firms in the 
market, one or a few may control the major part of it and, thus, behave as 
monopolist/oligopolists. Thus, market concentration can be measured in terms of how many 
firms control a certain market share. The government could make a merger illegal if the 
degree of concentration rises above a certain amount. If firms already control more than this 
percentage, they could be split into smaller firms. Whether this is efficient or not, depend on 
cost structure of the activity compared to size of market and the behavior of the firm. 
Competition laws in the EU, therefore, studies the actual performance of the firms rather than 
Ole Gunnar Austvik: Economics of Natural Gas Transportation. Lillehammer college: Research report no 53, 
2000. 
market share to assess whether or not, for example, a merger should be considered illegal or 
not.  
 
 Taxes and subsidies are often favored by economists to repair for market failures. These 
are used both to improve social efficiency and to redistribute income. To improve efficiency, 
taxes can be used to reduce the social costs of (negative) externalities, monopoly power, 
imperfect knowledge and irrational behavior. In some simplistic cases, taxes can be used to 
achieve first-best solutions. However, because it usually is infeasible to use different tax and 
subsidy rates towards different firms, and because the government lack detailed knowledge about 
markets, taxes and subsidies seldom achieves more than second-best solutions.  
 
 Under regulation, a "visible hand" is introduced in the absence of the market's 
"invisible hand". By regulating the framework and conditions for how the firm may operate, 
public authorities seek to achieve what is considered optimal for the society. The incentives 
and disincentives given for pricing and production should create mechanisms leading to an 
efficient allocation of resources and "acceptable" distribution of income. As part of 
intervening into firms' behavior, regulation may be introduced to direct the firm to behave in 
certain ways. The framework and regulatory mechanisms for the market must then be 
constructed in a way that companies voluntarily produce an amount at a price that gives 
maximal profits and simultaneously satisfies social goals. The regulations should lead to 
consistency between the company's desire to maximize profits and the society's desire for 
maximizing welfare, as in a perfectly competitive market. This is the core of regulatory 
economics. 
 
2. Schedules for Regulatory Regimes 
 
Rate-of-Return (ROR) Regulation - the "A-J-Effect 
 Averch-Johnson (1962) is considered one of the most influential investigations into 
regulations' effects on firm’s behavior. They showed that a regulation of return on capital not 
necessarily mitigate the aspects of monopoly control that the regulation addresses. They even 
concluded that such regulation could make the situation worse. 
 
 Consider a monopolist producing a single output q and using two factors of production, 
labor (L) and capital (K). The (market) price of capital and labor is denoted r and w, respectively. 
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Let q = q(L,K) denote the (neo-classical) production function, and the price of q as the inverse 
demand function p = p(q). The firm's (economic) profit (π) will be: 
(i) π= p(q) * q(L,K) - w*L - r*K
 
 
 Unregulated, the firm will chose its capital-labor ratio in a way that costs be minimized. 
This happens when the marginal rate of substitution between the two inputs q'K/q'L, are equal to 
the ratio of input prices, r/w.  When regulated, assume that the regulator allows a rate of return 
on capital equal to m.  Return on capital is defined as net revenues, which is gross revenues (p*q) 
minus costs of labor (w*L) and other possible non-capital input factors (here: zero) divided on 
amount of capital invested (K). The firm is otherwise unconstrained and can choose its 
price/tariff, level of output and input as long as profit does not exceed this "fair" rate. The rate of 
return constraint can be expressed as:  
       p(q) * q(L,K) - w*L
(ii) m ≥  --------------------------
K
 The behavior of the firm will vary a lot with which level of m is chosen. If the regulator 
sets m < r, the firm will make more profit by closing down the business and selling it's capital 
than continuing it's service (assuming no sunk cost and that it legally can do so).  
 
 If m = r, the firm makes zero economic profit which yields an indeterminate situation. 
The firm would earn the same profit per unit whether it increases or decreases output, whether it 
uses resources efficiently or inefficiently, or whether the input mix is optimal or not. The firm 
would, in fact, make the same money if it closed down and sold off it's capital (assuming no sunk 
cost). Thus, as the firm can chose many different outcomes, a ROR regulation that set r = m 
cannot be relied upon as a device to make it act in any particular way. 
 
 If the regulator set m ≥ rmon, where rmon is the return of an unregulated firm, the constraint 
is higher than what it possibly could make in the market. This will not change its behavior. In 
such a case there is essentially no regulation. 
Ole Gunnar Austvik: Economics of Natural Gas Transportation. Lillehammer college: Research report no 53, 
2000. 
  If the regulator set rmon > m > r, the rate of return is higher than the cost of capital but 
less than it would earn as unregulated monopolist, the firm will still earn an economic profit on 
it's investment. If we subtract the (market) price of capital from both sides of inequality (ii) and 
rearrange: 
m - r  ≥ (p*q - w*L) / K - r
m - r  ≥  (p*q - w*L - r*K) / K
m - r  ≥ π / K 
(iii) π ≤  (m - r) / K
 The maximum economic profit the firm can earn on it's investment is (m - r) / K.6 The 
problem with this approach is that if the firm is allowed to increase it's (economic) profit by 
increasing it's amount of capital. The rate of return (with an economic profit up to (m-r)) will 
remain the same, but in absolute terms profit becomes higher.  
 
 The discussion above showed that the only way the regulator can set the return constraint 
is by letting rmon > m > r.  Whether it is feasible or not for the firm to earn an economic profit on 
its investment under the constraint of an allowed profit ceiling depends on its technology and 
demand for service. Some combinations of K and L could exactly yield a rate of return r = m. If 
the firm can manage to find this set of K and L combinations, it chooses the one among them that 
uses the greatest amount of capital. This gives the highest absolute profit. If the capital stock is 
not increased, feasible profit will be lower (π< (m-r)K), and thus, inferior to the cost minimizing 
point with the maximum use of capital. Other cost minimizing combinations of K and L, yields 
the same economic profit but on a smaller amount of capital, and thus, less total profit.  
 
 In essence, the A-J analysis shows that the firm adopts an inefficient production plan, as 
it's marginal rate of transformation between capital and labor exceeds it's cost-minimizing level 
when the regulator set m > r: 
 
                                                 q'K/q'L  <  r/w
    6 If m = 0.12 (12 per cent), and r = 0.09 (9 per cent), the company's economic profit should not exceed 3 per cent.  
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 This implies that it over-invests and accumulates capital in order to relax the rate of return 
constraint. This is called the A-J effect. The regulated uses more capital than the unregulated; 
(K/L)reg > (K/L)mon, which will be an inefficient way of production. Thus, the output produced by 
the regulated firm can efficiently be produced with less capital and more labor at a lower cost.  
 
 Some modifications have been proposed to this type of regulation (Train, 1991: 20-67,  
94-113 and Berg & Tschirhart, 1989: 324-333). Rather than constraining the rate-of-return on 
capital, a constraint can be put on the return on output, revenue or cost. These modifications may 
induce the firm to behave more optimal than when return on capital is regulated.  
 
 Regulating return on output: In this case, the firm is allowed to make a profit on each unit 
of output. Now, the firm will expand output as long as consumers' willingness to pay is above 
total production cost (including allowed profit). If allowed return on output is set sufficiently 
low, the firm may end up close to where price equals average cost, or the second best solution in 
figure 8 (point B).  
 
 Regulating return on revenue: If the firm is allowed to make a certain profit on each unit 
of revenue, the firm will expand output in the same way as under a return-on-output regulation as 
long as marginal revenue is positive. When marginal revenue becomes negative, expanded 
output decreases revenue. Thus, the firm will produce at the point where total revenue is greatest, 
or when MR=0. Therefore, a return-on-revenue regulation will only approach the second-best-
solution if MR≥0 to this point. In figure 8 the volume produced will be quite far from the 
volumes representing point B. 
 
 Regulating return on cost: If the firm is allowed to make a certain profit on each unit of 
cost, it increases its allowed profit by increasing its cost. Maximum cost is accrued when output 
is maximized. However, increasing output, decreases revenues when MR < 0. Therefore, when 
MR < 0 the firm wishes to increase cost rather than output. The firms start to waste at outputs at 
this point. In the same way as under return-on-revenue regulation, although of a different reason, 
a return-on-cost regulation will only approach the second-best-solution if MR≥ 0. 
 
 Thus, regulating either the return on capital, revenue or cost yields inefficiencies by the 
firms’ behavior. Regulation of return on each output that is produced is the one form of 
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regulation that has the greatest chance of achieving a solution that in some sense may optimize 
social welfare, disregarding the problem of actually setting this rate with weak insight in firms 
cost curves.  
 
Price Discrimination – "Ramsey Pricing" 
 Under the regulations discussed above, we assumed that the firm charges the same price 
to all its customers. Price discrimination is, on the other hand, a situation where the firm charges 
prices for each unit of output equivalently to consumers' willingness to pay. Such price 
discrimination can be performed towards different type of customers, at different levels of 
output, seasons etc.  
 
 A firm that can charge prices equal to each consumer’s WTP performs a perfect price 
discrimination. By doing so, the firm receives an extra profit that is represented by the entire area 
under the demand curve and above the price equal to consumer's surplus. Referring to figure 8, a 
firm can expand output beyond qac under price discrimination, as long as p≥MC, because it's 
fixed costs are covered by already charging higher prices to customers with a high WTP (to the 
left of point B). Under price discrimination, as the firm increases output it has to decrease price 
all the way on the margin, but it does not have to lower the price taken from customers that are 
willing to pay a higher price. The firm wishes to sell more units as long as the price it receives 
from selling extra units exceeds the extra costs incurred by producing this unit (the marginal 
cost) without reducing the price for volumes already sold. 
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Figure 9: Effects of quantity changes on price and revenue
 
 
 In figure 9, let's first assume that all customers buying the volume q1 are charged the 
same price p1. If output is expanded from q1 to q2, without price discrimination, price must be 
reduced for all customers from p1 to p2. Gain in total revenue due to higher volumes is 
represented by the area DEFG and the loss in revenue due to lower prices is represented by the 
area ABCD. If DEFG > ABCD, there is a net gain and MR>0. Otherwise there will be a loss of 
revenue due to increased production. Let's then assume that increasing output from q1 to q2 do 
not lower prices customers are willing to pay for q1 only. In this case, when the firms take one 
price p1 for volumes q1, and another price p2 for volume q2-q1, the loss in revenues ABCD equals 
zero. Net gain will now be DEFG.  
 
 Either selling for the same price or under price discrimination, the firm sells an extra unit 
of output as long as its marginal revenue is above its marginal cost. When the firm must charge 
the same price to all customers, this happens where MR=MC (< AR as in point X in figure 8). 
Under perfect price discrimination, the firm chooses optimal output where p = MC = MR = AR, 
as in point C in figure 8. Thus, under perfect price discrimination, the demand curve becomes the 
marginal revenue curve. Under perfect price discrimination, the firm extracts all surpluses and 
none is left to consumers.  
 
 Price discrimination could bring the firm to the first best solution rather than to the 
second best solution and allows the firm to produce more output than under a regulatory 
Ole Gunnar Austvik: Economics of Natural Gas Transportation. Lillehammer college: Research report no 53, 
2000. 
mechanism that requires the same price for all outputs. The social success of such discrimination 
depend, inter alia, whether customers with a low WTP are able to resell their volumes to 
customers with a higher WTP. Normally, the pipeline itself can prevent this when unregulated. 
When regulated, the regulator must establish and enforce rules against such resale.  
 
 If prices on average shall equal average cost (firm breaks even) and prices are set 
differently to customers, the firm must deviate from marginal cost pricing (at least) for parts of 
it's sale. This should be done in a way that harms overall welfare as little as possible. At Ramsey 
pricing7, prices are raised more in markets with less elastic demand than in market were demand 
is more elastic, in inverse proportion to the values of each market's demand elasticity ("inverse 
elasticity rule"). This way of discriminating minimizes the welfare losses when prices are 
increased beyond marginal cost.  
 
 Under Ramsey pricing, output should be reduced from the point where p=MC by the 
same proportion in each market. The higher prices obtained by these even output reductions and 
uneven price reactions, reduces the firm's loss compared to a situation where prices are increased 
similar in all markets until the (common) price equal marginal cost. Output should continuously 
be reduced proportionately until the firm eventually breaks even. More revenue can be obtained 
with less reduction of output (and less disruption in consumption patterns) if prices are raised 
more in markets with inelastic demand. In this way, total surplus is reduced as little as possible, 
and the firm can break-even without being subsidized by the government.  
 
 In figure 10, the product is sold in two markets, market 1 and market 2. At p=MC, each 
market wants to consume equal amounts, q*, of the product (marginal cost is assumed constant). 
The only difference between the markets is that demand in market 1 is more inelastic than 
demand in market 2. If output is reduced by the same amount in each market, down to q**, price 
in market 1 increases to p1 while price in market 2 increases to p2, where p1 > p2.  
                                                 
    7 After Ramsey (1927). Ramsey showed how governments could set tax rates for various goods and at the same time disturb consumers' surplus 
as little as possible. Baumol and Bradford (1970) uses this principle for setting second-best pricing for multiproduct natural monopolies. 
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 By doing this, market 1 contributes with a profit to the firm represented by area ABCD 
and market 2 to a profit represented by area EFGH. Total profit contribution from the two 
markets would be ABCD + EFGH = (p1-MC) + (p2-MC) * q**. Output should be reduced in this 
way until total profit contribution from the two markets makes the firm brakes even. 
 
 In a more general form, denoting the sale of q in the two markets as q1 and q2, the 
Ramsey rule tells that the relative quantity change shall be the same in each market in order to 
make consumers behave very much as they would have without the price increase:   
(i) ∆q1/q1 = ∆q2/q2.
 (i) is the “inverse elasticity rule” in volume terms. Expressed in price terms, prices should 
be raised inversely related to elasticity of demand in each market: 
 
(ii) (p1-MC)/p1) * ε1 = ((p2-MC)/p2) * ε2
where εi is the price elasticity of demand in market i (i=1,2): εi = dqi/dpi * pi/qi.
 Ramsey pricing is already applied in the European gas market, for example when peak-
load pricing formulas are used. Under this system, the price that consumers pay varies, in order 
for the firm to cover average costs, including normal profit. This principle would set prices 
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higher when demand in general is more inelastic (especially in winter months). Under this type 
of price setting, parts of consumers’ surplus are transferred to transmission companies when 
demand is inelastic and from transmission companies when demand is more elastic. Such pricing 
satisfy efficiency considerations quite well, as they distort consumption patterns as little as 
possible, and much less than if the same price were charges in both periods (for example in 
winter and summer).  
 
Subsidizing to Marginal Cost Pricing 
 If a regulator possesses all information on cost and demand curves, he could simply 
require prices to be set at marginal cost and give the firm a subsidy, equal to area HDCI in figure 
8, in order to let it make a normal profit. Together with nationalization, this has been an 
important principle for how natural monopolies have been dealt with in many European 
countries after WW2. However, the regulator rarely has all this information. The company has 
also incentives to misreport costs in order to increase profits. If reported correctly, incurred cost 
may not be minimum cost of production, for example due to inefficiencies or sub-optimal 
capacity choice. Thus, making the firm produce in the firs-best-option is not an easy challenge. 
Our question here is whether it possible to design some subsidizing mechanisms that induces the 
firm to produce at marginal cost without a public ownership and regulator’s knowledge of the 
position and shape of cost curves? 
 
 Let's assume that the regulator knows that the firm will not charge prices higher than pa 
in figure 11. This price could for example be the monopolistic price of an unregulated natural 
monopoly. The regulator subsidizes the firm for the portion of consumer surplus between pa and 
the price the firm actually charges. Thus, the lower price the firm charges, the higher the subsidy. 
If the firm sets prices equal to pb = MC, the firm maximizes the transfer of subsidy and at the 
same time behaves in an optimal manner.  
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 Loeb and Magat (1979) showed that, in general, if the regulator subsidizes the firm by the 
entire consumer surplus (CS) generated at the price existing in the market, the firm would choose 
to produce at p=MC. In order to do this, the regulator must have information on the demand 
curve and the firm's price, and no information on cost is needed. Firm's profit would equal total 
social surplus, or the sum of producers’ (PS) and consumers' surplus. Because this surplus is the 
greatest when p=MC, the firm maximizes profit (the sum of PS and the subsidy = CS) at this 
point.  
 
 This will be true even if many products exist. By setting all prices equal to marginal cost, 
profit is maximized in all markets and market segments when receiving such a subsidy. Any 
decrease in cost results in an increase in profits and firms have an incentive to produce 
efficiently. As the government pays the subsidy, consumers' surplus is also maximized by this 
rule, if we disregard that the funding for the subsidy must be collected from many (but not 
necessarily all) of these consumers.  
 
 Such a transfer from the public to the firm may be considered inequitable. One way of 
reducing it, but maintaining the main principle, is to subsidize only a portion of CS. As the firm 
could never charge prices higher than pa in figure 11, it could not receive the CS accrued above 
pa. By subsidizing only the portion accrued below pa, the same result is obtained as if transfers 
should equal the entire area under the demand curve. This type of transfer should cost less for the 
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public, and thus, be of a less intolerable size from equity considerations. If we refer these results 
to figure 8, unsubsidized profit for pmon(=pa in figure 11) is represented by area GAEF. Subsidy 
when pmc (=pb in figure 11) is represented by the area GACI > GAEF.  
 
 By moving p (=pa in figure 11) down from pmon along the demand curve, the firm's 
economic profit will decrease as will total subsidy. The difficulty is to set p sufficiently high, but 
not higher than what is necessary, in order to make the firm brake even. But the inequality GACI 
> GAEF holds all the way until the firm earns only normal profit. At this point, the subsidy will 
equal the firm’s loss when producing at prices equal to marginal cost. Train (1991: 182-190) 
discusses some regulatory mechanisms that have been proposed in order to find these optimal 
prices. He suggests a multiperiod marginal cost approaches, where prices, revenues and 
expenditures in one period determine the subsidy of the firm in the next period with or without 
full information about the position and shape of the demand curve.8 Another alternative is to use 
multipart tariffs. 
 
Multipart Tariffs 
 A multipart tariff consists of several billing components. There are two main types of 
multipart tariffs: access/usage tariffs and block rates. 
 
 Access/usage tariffs consist of an access charge, which is a fixed fee for having the right 
to use a system, and a usage charge, which is a per-unit tariff for actually using it. For example, 
telephone companies often use access/usage tariffs, billing one fee for access to the network, and 
one (per unit) fee for each call made. This system makes consumers’ marginal cost for each call 
constant, but their average cost (the average price for consumption of telephone use over a 
period) declines with the number of calls.  
 
 Block rate tariffs changes when total level of consumption reaches certain thresholds. For 
example, electricity companies often charges one price for consumption of a certain number of 
kilowatt-hours and another charge (higher or lower) for additional kilowatt-hours. This system 
makes consumers' marginal cost of using electricity change with the level of consumption, while 
                                                 
    8 See also Sappington and Sibley (1988) and Vogelsang and Finsinger (1979).  
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the average cost (the average price for using one kilowatt hour) is the weighed average of the 
price of all units consumed and may increase or decrease depending on the tariff structure. 
 
Access / Usage Tariffs – “the Coase Argument" 
 Coase (1946) argued that the first-best solution for a natural monopoly (price equal 
marginal cost) could be reached if demand for usage is fixed and an access/usage pricing system 
is used. The access fee should be set to cover the natural monopoly's fixed costs and the usage 
fee to cover marginal cost of usage. In this situation, the aggregated access fees are considered a 
transfer of funds from consumers to producers as if the firm received a subsidy from 
government. The access fee will not affect consumption of service as long as the access fee 
covers fixed costs. The firm will benefit by supplying more output as long as price is equal to or 
higher than marginal cost. When demand for access is fixed and the fixed cost are covered by the 
"subsidy", the firm will gain by reducing usage fees down to marginal cost of production. Up to 
this point consumer's willingness to pay is greater than firms marginal cost of providing the 
service. Any other price or if the firm starts to waste, will incur a loss and, accordingly, the firm 
will serve in an efficient manner. 
 
 However, demand for access is not always fixed, but may vary with the access charge. 
When demand for access is price-sensitive, any rise in the access fee will, to some extent, lower 
demand for access. Low access charges may, for example, increase the number of households 
installing pipes and equipment for use of gas. In a situation with price-sensitive access demand, 
the access fee influences demand for access and indirectly the demand for usage. The access fee 
can no longer be considered only to be a transfer from customers to the firm.  
 
 Consider the access and the usage of the firm's services as two different goods with 
separate but interrelated demand, each with a separate marginal cost. For example, there is one 
demand for installing a new pipe and equipment into a house and another for the actual use of 
gas when equipment is already installed. With price-sensitive demand for access, optimality can 
be reached if access fees are set equal to marginal cost of access and usage fees equal to marginal 
cost of usage. The problem is that with access fees set at marginal cost of access a loss is often 
incurred to the firm, as average cost of access if often higher than it's marginal cost.  
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 If the firm runs a loss, somehow access must be reduced in order to rise access fees for 
the firm to brake even. From an efficiency point of view, the reduction in access should be 
allocated in a way that consumption pattern is distorted as little as possible. Ramsey access and 
usage fees for the two goods may achieve this. Each customer or group of customers should then 
reduce consumption by the same proportion, and prices raised for each of them according to their 
inverse price elasticity of demand. If demand for access is totally inelastic (zero), then the 
Ramsey rule applied in this situation reduces to the result presented by Coase. This may be true 
if access fees are relatively low. If not, access fees should be raised to whatever level is necessary 
for the firm to break even and usage charges reduced to cover usage (marginal) costs of usage. 
This will generate a second-best solution, as Ramsey pricing does in general.9 
 
 Figure 12 depicts a situation where consumers take into consideration both the access and 
usage charge. Let's assume that the usage fee is fixed equal to pusage and that the line AE, given 
that the customer has access to the system, represents the demand curve for usage. The area ADF 
then represents consumers’ surplus. If the usage fee is raised, consumers’ surplus is reduced 
accordingly. At some level of the usage fee, consumer surplus is not greater than the access fee 
anymore. This is assumed to happen at p*, where the area ABC the size of the access fee. At 
usage fees pusage < p*, the consumer will demand usage depending only on the usage fee, 
independently of the access fee.  
                                                 
    9 In a situation when usage demand is fixed, but not access demand, the access fee should be set equal to the marginal cost of access, while the 
usage fee is set sufficiently high in order to make the firm break even. That is, natural monopolies that does not use access fees, but only usage 
fees, can do so only if usage demand is less elastic than access demand. However, this is very rarely the case for a natural monopoly as fixed 
compared to variable costs are usually very high. 
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 Obviously, ex ante, the size of the access fee must be taken into consumer’s 
consideration as well. Consumers know that the surplus they get will be the consumers surplus 
generated at the usage fee charged minus the access fee (ADF-ABC). Therefore, at pusage > p*, 
the consumer will choose not to acquire access. In this case the benefit of usage will be less than 
the cost of getting access.  If pusage<p*, consumers get a net surplus equal to area BCDF. The 
lower the usage fees the greater the surplus. This means that the consumer will have no demand 
for service at usage fees above p*. Therefore, ex ante, the kinked line ABCE represents demand 
for service. Ex post, when the customer has paid the access fee, the line AE will be the demand 
curve. If consumers net surplus is sufficiently large, which happens when (relative) changes in 
access and usage fees within 'reason' does not induce consumers to forego service, access 
demand can be considered fixed. Then access fees can be raised to the point where fixed costs 
are covered (the Coase result). However, demand for access is fixed only if the surplus from 
usage is so much greater than the access fee, that “relevant” changes in access and usage fees 
does not imply that consumers forego service.  
 
Block Rates 
 The term 'block' rates have arisen from the particular form of its graphical presentation, 
as the pricing algorithm looks like series of blocks. Consumption of service under each of the 
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prices is called a 'block'. In a declining block rate tariff, as shown in figure 13, price (p) for each 
unit consumed declines with the level of consumption (q). In the figure the following rates exist: 
 
p1 for    0  <  q < q1 
p2 for    q1 ≤ q < q2 
p3 for    q2 ≤ q      
 
 In this case, there exists three blocks: 0 < q < q1, q1 ≤ q < q2 and q2 ≤ q. The price the 
consumer pays for an additional unit of consumption is called the marginal price and the prices 
that applies for lower levels of consumption the inframarginal price. In figure 13, a customer 
that consumes q1<q<q2 faces a marginal price of p=p2 and an inframarginal price of p=p1>p2. At 
consumption q>q2, the marginal price would have been p=p3<p2 and two inframarginal prices 
would exist, p1 and p2. 
p2
p
q
Figure 13: Declining block rate tariff
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 Block rates can, of course, also be 'inverted', as opposed to declining. Inverted block rates 
consist of blocks with higher, instead of declining, prices with higher level of consumption. 
Beyond the first block marginal price is below average price under declining block rates and 
above average price under inverted block rates. Usage charges under a system with access/usage 
tariffs can, of course, also consist of block rates, making a combination of the two pricing 
systems possible. 
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 With a block-tariff system the question arises how to determine the optimal threshold(s) 
and price(s) in each block. Optimality is reached when consumers’ surplus is the greatest given 
that the firm should break even. This may sometimes yield a first-best outcome and sometimes a 
second-best outcome. 
 
 Let p1 in figure 14 represent the (uniform) price before a block-tariff system is 
introduced. This yields consumption of q1. Marginal cost (MC) is assumed constant. Then the 
uniform system is replaced by a two-block tariff system, which set the threshold for consumption 
at which tariff changes equal to q1 and the price for the second block to p2<p1 above marginal 
cost. With this two-block pricing system, the price for output up to q1 is maintained. By 
increasing consumption up to q2 at the lower price p2, consumers get an extra surplus of ABF and 
the firm an extra profit of FBDE. No party is worse off compared to the system with a uniform 
price, in fact in our example both consumers and the firm is better off. Thus, such a block-tariff 
system is Pareto dominating the uniform tariff system.  
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 If this is the situation for a single customer consuming more than q1, the area FGHA can 
be considered similar to an access fee under an access/usage tariff system. The usage tariff will 
equal to p2 for all quantities demanded, as the "access fee" FGHA must be paid "first" in order to 
consume more than q1. The consumer faces the same total bill under both systems. The bill under 
a block rate tariff system will be  q1*p1 + (q2-q1)*p2. The bill under an access/usage tariff system 
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will be q1*(p1-p2) + q2 * p2. Producers face the same marginal price (p2) under both systems and 
receive the same total revenue as consumers pay the same total amount.10  
 
 By replacing a "one-block" tariff (or a uniform price) by a two-block tariff, the 
deadweight loss is reduced to from ACE to DCB. It is easy to see from the figure that 
introducing a third block at outputs with a threshold q2<q<q3 at any price MC<p<p2, reduces the 
deadweight loss further to the benefit of consumers’ surplus and firm’s profit. Thus, surplus is 
improved by increasing the number of blocks, and, in principle, until the first-best outcome is 
reached (p=MC for the last unit). If number of blocks are N, an optimal N+1 tariff provides 
greater surplus than the optimal N block tariff as long as the tariff of block number N is greater 
than marginal cost of service. 
 
 At a given q=q1, the optimal prices for each block, p1 and p2, should be set in a way that 
it distort consumption as little as possible (given that the firm shall break even). One good is 
consider the output within one block. By using the inverse elasticity rule of Ramsey pricing, the 
price is raised more for the good with the lower elasticity. For consumers in the second block, the 
inframarginal price in block one does not affect their consumption. At increasingly higher 
quantities of output, however, in particular in the second block, demand becomes more price 
sensitive. Thus, prices in the first block should be higher than in the second if consumer surplus 
should be distorted as little as possible. This is the reason why the optimal block-rate tariff 
usually consists of declining blocks, rather than inverted block-rates with prices rising at each 
successive threshold.11 
 
 In the example above, the threshold was set in a way that consumers demand exactly q1 
at price p1. Under a uniform price system this will be the customer’s demand. The introduction of 
a declining block rate tariff will be to the benefit for each consumer, as it makes it possible to 
consume more. The two-block system will increase consumption to q2, and surplus is increased 
by the area AFB in figure 14. Now, assume that the threshold for block 1 is set higher than q1 
(q1<q=q*<q2), as shown in figure 15. Because the first block is larger than consumer’s 
                                                 
    10 This is true if there is no (positive or negative) externalities or transactions costs and the consumer knows its demand. However, if these 
assumptions does not hold there is a difference between them as consumers could in certain situation desire access without having any charged 
usage. 
    11 However, from an equity consideration, inverted block rates may be preferable. Inverted block rates are lower for smaller quantities of 
output. Consumers face the lowest rates at low levels of consumption. This benefit low-income consumers, while declining rates benefit larger 
and high-income consumers.  
Ole Gunnar Austvik: Economics of Natural Gas Transportation. Lillehammer college: Research report no 53, 
2000. 
willingness to pay, there is a loss of consuming more than q1 as illustrated by the area AJK. The 
gain by increasing consumption to q2 is reduced from AFB to KLB. If KBL>AJK it is a net gain 
of continue consuming q2 at the new threshold q=q*. However, the closer q* approaches q2, the 
smaller the gain and eventually it becomes a net loss.  
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Figure 15: Loss and gains by determining the block threshold
Demand curve
J
p2
p1
q*q1 q2
F
A
MC
loss
gain
 
 As long as consumers continue to consume in the second block, their elasticity of 
demand is zero in the first block. The inverse elasticity rule suggests that the price in the second 
block should be set equal to firm's marginal cost and the price in the first block sufficiently high 
for revenues to cover total cost. By using Ramsey pricing to determine p2 and p1, where p2=MC 
and (p1-MC)*q1 equal the revenues needed for the firm to brake even (mainly fixed costs), first 
best optimality can be achieved. 
 
 Thus, the optimal threshold in a two-block tariff system depends on which price-output 
combination make the firm breaks even. A reduction in the threshold gives more consumption in 
the second block, which benefits consumers, but simultaneously less revenue to the firm 
(assuming p1 constant). Usually a reduction in the threshold will also increase the number of 
customers. At the optimal threshold, the gains and losses for consumers and firms are equal 
when the threshold is changed in either direction. Even if this is rather unprecise from a practical 
perspective, it may nevertheless give some assistance in determining the threshold.  
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 Determining Optimal Capacity 
 In the long run, all costs for the firm can be considered variable. However, in periods 
from when an investment decision is made until a pipeline actually operates, capacity must be 
considered fixed. Ex post, capacity is determined by the investment done in a pipeline. Ex ante, 
capacity can be adjusted. The question is how to determine the size of capacity. 
 
 Corrected for uncertainty, a new pipeline project should give a positive net present value 
of the investment at an appropriate discount rate. One way of considering this investment is in 
terms of flow of expenditures, rather than as a one-time payment. This flow of expenditures may 
include mortgage payments on the loans taken to finance the project and varies in particular with 
the repayment period and the interest rate.12  
 
 The annual flow of expenditures per unit of capacity (a) represents the cost of increasing 
capacity from K to K+1, at all capacity uses at a given capacity. The short run marginal cost 
(SRMC) for output q≤K is denoted b. Both a and b are assumed constant of reasons of 
simplicity. Then, long run marginal cost (LRMC) of producing one output is the sum of the costs 
of expanding capacity by one unit and the cost of producing it at this capacity; LRMC=a+b as 
shown in figure 16.  
 
 At output q1, consumers are willing to pay the price p1. Their WTP exceed both variable 
and average fixed costs. The difference between price p1 and SRMC is p1-b and represent the 
amount consumers are willing to pay more than variable cost for capacity to be expanded in 
order to get one additional unit of output.  
 
 
                                                 
    12 With societies' lower discount rates compared to the private ones, caused by a usually longer time perspective and an overall view on the gas 
business and the economy, a project may be right to realize for the society but not for the private company. On the other hand, governments are 
normally risk averse, i.e. the numerical cost of the possibility of losing one dollar is often viewed as larger than the benefit of gaining one. Private 
businesses may be more risk neutral (the numerical cost of the possibility of losing one dollar equals the benefit of one). Some may even be risk 
lovers (the numerical cost of losing one dollar is smaller than the benefit of gaining one). If private industries are less risk averse than govern-
ments, they may tend to invest sooner than governments. The assessment of the uncertainty, at a given discount rate, will depend on factors as the 
resources at hand, market possibilities, the presence of alternative energies, time horizon etc. The advantages of the government's longer and 
more general view,  may be of particular importance for huge and strategically important pipelines due to reasons of security of supply, overall 
economic considerations et.c. 
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Figure 16: Optimal capacity determined at prices 
     equal to long run marginal costs
 
 At all levels of output q<q0 (where q0 is the amount demanded at p=b), consumers are 
willing to pay for additional capacity. Thus, the demand curve for capacity is the bolded line in 
figure 16 with a kink at q=q0. Demand for extra capacity at q≥q0 equals zero. However at 
qlrmc<q<q0 prices does not cover more than a part of a pipelines' fixed cost. Only if consumers' 
WTP for extra capacity exceed the cost of building extra capacity, it contributes with a net 
surplus. The optimal level of capacity and capital investment is where the demand curve 
intersects the LRMC-curve at K=qlrmc (where qlrmc is the amount demanded at p=a+b).  
 
 Social optimum is achieved if prices are set equal to marginal cost of production (at given 
production capacity). In figure 16, short run marginal cost is constant equal to b for outputs q≤K. 
If demand exceed K at p=b, no more output can be provided (in the short run), and marginal cost 
increases infinitely. Thus, the (short run) marginal cost curve for providing q is horizontal for 
0<q≤K and kinked at q=qlrmc to a vertical position for q>K at a given capacity (se figure 19). 
Using a marginal cost pricing principle in this situation yield prices at or above b depending on 
where the demand curve intersect the (short run) marginal cost curve (b).  
 
 A problem in determining demand is that it varies over the year. Figure 17 shows 
atypical pattern over seasons for the consumption of natural gas in Europe. Consumption in 
summer months is only one-third of winter peak consumption.  
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 Figure 17. Seasonal consumption of natural gas in OECD-Europe.
Source: (IEA (1994), page 35
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 Let’s denote the cost of adding capacity a in each period (summer and winter). 
Customers in high and low demand periods are considered of equal importance. Thus, total cost 
over both periods is 2a. If consumers’ WTP for capacity on average over high and low demand 
periods exceed the cost per period, or a, capacity should be added. That is WTPsummer + WTPwinter 
≥ 2a. 
 
 Combinations of high and low demand situations (peak and off-peak periods) with 
consumers’ average WTP greater than the cost of adding capacity can exist if one or both of 
them are willing to pay more than the cost of increasing capacity. In figure 18 we have drawn 
one off-peak demand curve (Doff) and one peak demand curve (Dpeak) as one possible 
combination of the two. qoff is the amount off-peak consumers are demanding and qpeak is the 
amount peak consumers are willing to consume at price p=b (SRMC). We assume that the two 
"groups" of customers consume only in their respective periods and each of them are willing to 
pay for additional capacity as long as q<qoff for off-peak consumers and q<qpeak for peak 
consumers. 
  
 As the two groups of consumers are weighed equal, the average willingness to pay can be 
determined in the middle between peak and off-peak demand curves. For example at output q1, 
off-peak consumers are willing to pay CE and peak consumers AE for additional outputs, where 
AE>CE. The average willingness to pay will be in the middle between CE and AE, which is BE 
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(where AB=BC). Thus, B is one point on a new curve showing average demand over the two 
periods.  
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Figure 18: Optimal capacity with two period demand
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 Up to qoff, off-peak consumers are willing to pay for extra capacity while peak consumers 
are willing to pay for additional capacity up to qpeak. At output levels qoff<q<qpeak, off-peak 
consumers are not willing to pay for adding new capacity to the system. Thus, demand for new 
off-peak capacity is zero a q>qoff and off-peak consumers' demand curve will be a curve kinked 
at F, running through the points CFI. Capacity demand for peak consumers (AG) will be zero at 
q>qpeak and will be kinked at G, running through point AGI. The average demand curve can be 
drawn in the middle between these two kinked curves, shown as Daverage running through points 
BHGI. The distance between this new curve and b, expresses consumers' average WTP for extra 
capacity. Optimal capacity is determined where average willingness to pay in the two periods 
equal long run marginal cost, equivalent to the one-period example above. This happens at point 
L, with capacity K at LRMC prices a+b.  At point L, average willingness to pay for extra 
capacity equals the cost of adding it.  
 
Pricing in Peak and Off-Peak Periods – "Riordan Regulation" 
 A situation of high and low demand (peak and off-peak demand) compared to capacity 
is shown in figure 19. Marginal cost curves at fixed capacity (K) is shown as kinked bolded 
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lines. Graph A shows a situation with low demand (≤K) and graph B a situation with high 
demand (>K), both at prices equal to short run marginal cost (b).  
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Figure 19: Optimal marginal cost pricing at high and low demand
(A) p=MC and q≤K
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 In graph A, quantity q*<K is demanded at p=b. There is no way capacity K-q* can be 
used as long as consumers' WTP < SRMC at these levels of output. In graph B, quantity 
demanded at p=b is greater than capacity, which is impossible in the short run. In this situation, 
somehow q=K must be rationed among consumers. Economist usually argue that the most 
efficient way of rationing is to raise prices high enough to exhaust demand, that is setting 
p=p*>b.  Other methods of rationing may lead to a situation where a consumer that is willing to 
pay a price above marginal costs (at q≤K) may not get the product. A consumer that is not 
willing to pay such a price, for example by queuing, a draw, use of force or size, may get it. 
Thus, if demand for transportation in winter months exceeds capacity and is lower than capacity 
during summer months, transportation tariffs should be higher during winter than in summer. 
 
 However, the firm obviously looses money in summer months with such a pricing 
principle, as it earns no profit to contribute to investment costs. On the other hand, in winter 
months the firm makes a profit (p*-b)*q*. On total, it will not be possible from this information to 
determine whether the firm runs a loss or a surplus. There are mainly two ways the firm can 
cover the difference between total revenues and total costs. Government can give the amount to 
the firm as subsidy or an access charge can be added without affecting the usage charge. The 
access charge can be evenly distributed on consumers if demand is fixed (the Coase result) or be 
allocated by resorting to Ramsey prices, depending on the degree of price responsiveness to 
access charges.  
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  Riordan (1984) discusses how such fixed capacity pricing can be achieved through a 
regulatory mechanism. The idea is that the firm receives a subsidy from the government or 
charges an access fee that amounts to the fixed costs of capacity minus the amount prices 
exceed marginal cost times capacity. In order to do this, the regulator need to know the price 
charged in the market, the actual capacity of the firm and it's variable and fixed costs, but he 
does not need information about the demand curve. The information needed is usually 
accessible, at least as proximate, even in natural gas markets.  
 
 In figure 20 the two situations with demand ≤K (graph A) and demand >K (graph B) is 
redrawn. In graph A, the price for service is set at p=b and the firm receives a subsidy/access fee 
to cover fixed costs, amounting to a*K.  If the firm attempts to raise the price from b to p1, his 
(economic) profit would increase with the area ABEF = (p1-b)*q1. But, an amount equal to the 
price increase times capacity is withdrawn from his subsidy/access fee, represented by area 
ACDF = (p1-b)*K.  Obviously, ACDF>ABEF, and the firm suffers a loss by increasing price 
beyond b. The main point is that while the price increase raises profit on the basis of actual 
output, the subsidy/access fee is reduced on the basis of capacity. 
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Figure 20: Optimal behavior under Riordan regulation
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 In graph B, prices are set equal to p*, equal to marginal cost at the given demand and 
capacity K=q*. The firm earns a profit over variable costs equal to area FDIG to cover fixed 
costs. If the subsidy/access fee is set equal to it's fixed cost minus the area FDIG the firm breaks 
even. If prices are raised from p* to p1, it's profit would increase by the area ABEF-EDIH. The 
subsidy/access fee will be reduced with the area ACDF. Again, because the subsidy/access fee is 
calculated on the basis of capacity, while profit is calculated on the basis of actual output, net 
profit suffer a loss. The firm must choose between earning either normal profit or less than 
normal profit.  
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  Obviously, in "low demand periods", a p=SRMC-principle could yield p≥b as well as in 
high demand periods and vise versa. In general, over both the high and low demand periods 
(over the year) the firms profit will, when a subsidy/access fee = S is included, be: 
 
(i) π= (plow-b)*qlow - a*K + Slow + (phigh-b)*qhigh - a*K + Shigh
 
 The footscripts 'high' and 'low' indicates that the values of the variables refer to high 
and low demand periods, for example winter and summer. a*K, represent the (flow of) 
capacity costs over each period. For simplicity reasons we have assumed that the year is 
divided into two equal parts, such that K is half-of-the year per unit fixed cost. The size of the 
subsidy/access fee in each period must equal: 
 
(ii) Si = a*k - (pi-b)*K  at  pi  ≥ b,  where i = high, low
 
 Substituting (ii) into (i) and rearranging yields a profit expressed as: 
          high
                  π =  Σ  (pi-b)(qi-K)
                                               i=low
 Pricing at pi=b and producing an amount of output equal to capacity (qi=K) yields zero 
(economic) profit. Because the firm must set pi≥b (to cover variable costs) and qi≤K (output 
cannot exceed capacity), the term (pi-b) is greater or equal to zero and the term (qi-K) less or 
equal to zero. If the firm sets pi>b, which it is allowed to do, and output is below capacity 
(qi<K), profit will be negative. As long as actual output must be lower than capacity at p>b, the 
firm will loose money by raising prices above marginal cost. In all other situation the firm will 
make normal profit. Riordan argues that these mechanisms induce the firm to price service in all 
markets and periods equal to its marginal cost, and thus the first best solution can be achieved.  
 
 One problem using such a pricing principle is that LRMC for a new pipeline is often 
above the average cost of the existing pipeline. One way of covering the costs of new 
construction is to roll them into the charge for all transportation services. A new average cost 
level would be established including costs in both old and new pipelines. This may involve new 
subsidy/access charges in old pipelines when capacity is expanded. The price paid for 
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transportation will under this arrangement not reflect the true costs in each pipeline, as some 
costs will lie above and some below the average tariff. Another way is to consider each pipeline 
project separately. Under this arrangement, the newer pipeline will operate with higher costs and 
the users will have to pay a higher tariff using this pipeline as opposed to using the old ones.  
 
 A tariff structure that sets different rates for each pipeline meets the efficiency criterion 
that prices should equal marginal costs better than when the costs of a new pipeline is rolled into 
the charges for all transportation services. However, such a price structure may lead to 
competition between different shippers attempting to gain access to the oldest, and thus the 
cheapest, pipeline. Market structure and the ability to bundle services will influence the evolution 
of this allocation. But even if new and old gas are reallocated between pipelines, the marginal 
quantities will still have to pay the new pipeline's higher marginal cost which serves to 
equilibrate the market for transmission services over time. 
 
 By giving subsidies or regulating the access fee, Riordan suggests that the regulator can 
induce the firm to install the optimal level of capacity, as well. Because the firm will be 
indifferent to which capacity level to choose, as long as it earns no more than normal profit in 
any situation, he suggest that the regulator should actually know the level of capacity by his/hers 
own evaluation. Then, by subsidizing or regulating the access charges according to which 
capacity level is optimal, the firm will actually choose this level. Any other choices will result in 
less than normal profit.  
 
 The problem of excess demand allocation has been particularly debated within the natural 
gas industry. The Ramsey pricing principle may cause intolerable distribution of income, as the 
most needing may the most. One alternative has been to use a pro rata system. In this system all 
customers shall be allocated access in proportion to the volume of their shipment. Existing 
customers' volume is reduced in order to allow incremental customers' access. In the U.S., which 
has been using this system, downstream customers can choose between buying a good bundled - 
both the gas and it's transportation fee - from a pipeline or paying the unbundled transportation 
charge. All shippers according to their nominated volumes share the burden of excess demand.13 
A problem with this approach is that an allocation on the size of volume need not be 
                                                 
    13 In order to give access to new customers, the initial volumes cannot be used as an allocation device. Such a pro rata system is used in a 
Common Carriage arrangement (as in the U.S.).  
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economically efficient, which can lead to gaming to determine the size of the nominated 
quantities.  
 
 Another alternative has been to take "high-priority" customers before those with "low-
priority". In the United States, FERC defines "high" and "low" priority. Schools, hospitals and 
small commercial users have high priority, while large industrial direct users have low priority. 
Of course, other priority rankings are possible, such as first-come first-served, bidding and 
auctioning etc.14 
 
 In the U.S., an arrangement that is called mandatory contract carriage has been 
considered. Under this schedule, a customer can contract for "firm" transportation service and get 
a higher priority than "interruptible" service. Interruptible service can be delayed in order to 
fulfill firm transportation commitments.15 
 
4. When Regulation Threatens; Conflict or Cooperation?  
 Generally, transmission companies and LDCs will receive lower margins when regulated 
as compared to an unregulated situation. The drop in profit will be distributed to producers, 
customers, final consumers or to producing or consuming countries’ treasuries through taxation 
depending on how the system is liberalized (Austvik, 1997). Even though transmission 
companies’ and LDCs' margins are rather stable under both systems, their economic profit will 
be lost or, at least, reduced. In addition, competition between transporters may be established, at 
least on some distances, which could make more variations in throughput. In a liberalized market 
system, transporters may face both lower margins and increased volatility and risk regarding 
volume. Thus, they have every reason to oppose almost any type of liberalization, as compared 
to today's system. The question here is: Will they be better off by going into conflict with the 
regulator or is it better to cooperate and try to “trap” him/her in order to make the regulator do 
what they want? 
 
                                                 
    14 See e.g. Hogan (1989). 
    15 Broadman (1987) discusses alternative ways of allocating excess demand in more depth.  
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Conflict With the Regulator 
 Let's first consider the interest of the regulator (for example represented by the EU 
Commission) in a liberalization process simplified to a desire to unconditionally take away the 
transporters’ economic profit and give it to consumers. The interest of the transporter is assumed 
unconditionally to maintain as much profit as possible. Thus, the interests of the regulator and 
the consumers are assumed identical and conflicting. Under the assumption set up, the game is 
not zero-sum for society, as regulation is assumed to yield a greater surplus for consumers than 
the loss incurred on transporters. This binary situation (the choice between regulation and no 
regulation) is illustrated in figure 21.  
 
 Both the regulator and the 
(potentially) regulated can chose between 
favoring a process that introduce regulation 
and a process where no regulation takes 
place. The outcome for the transporter is 
depicted in the upper right corner in each 
cell, and the outcome for the regulator is 
depicted in the lower left. Best possible 
outcome for each party is value 3 and worst 
possible outcome value 0 (zero). All utility 
is considered ordinal, which means that 
each party may rank the outcomes, but do not know how much better or worse it is compared to 
another outcome.16  
Figure 21: Regulation through force
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 If the regulator does not regulate, consumers get no extra surplus, which represents their 
and the regulator’s worst possible outcome, equal to the value 0 (zero). At the same time, no 
regulatory initiative is the best possible outcome for the transporter, achieving maximum profit, 
with the value of 3, as depicted in cell I.  On the other extreme, if the market should be perfectly 
liberalized, and the transporter fully accepts the regulator’s terms for operations on a normal 
profit basis, consumers' surplus is maximized. This outcome would be the worst possible for 
transporters, value 0 (zero), but the best possible for the regulator, value 3. The outcome when 
both parties favor regulation is depicted in cell III.  
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    16 Under cardinal utility, utility can be measured and it is possible to say how much better or worse one outcome is compared to another. 
  If the transporter opposes regulation and the regulator nevertheless chose to regulate, the 
outcome for the regulator (and consumers) must be assumed to be less than if the transporters 
just accept new terms for operation. Now, transporters fight against intervention, making as 
much difficulties as possible for the regulator, and tries to postpone and destroy regulator's 
initiatives. In spite of this resistance, the regulatory efforts can be expected to yield a better 
outcome for consumers than no regulation at all, but less than if the transporter adheres. This 
outcome for the regulator is depicted with the value 2 in cell IV. At the same time, transporters 
will gain compared to a strategy just following regulator's desires, but less than if no regulation 
was introduced, depicted with the value 1. Cell II represents a situation where transporters want 
to be regulated and the regulator don't and are, under our assumptions, considered an impossible 
combination of strategies. 
 
 Even if the outcome for each depends on the choice of the other, both the transporter and 
the regulator have dominant strategies independent of the other’s choice. The transporter will 
gain 0 (nothing) if regulation is supported, and 3 or 1 if regulation is opposed. Thus, opposing 
regulation will be a dominant strategy for the transporter. The regulator will gain 0 (nothing) if it 
does not regulate and 2 or 3 if it does. Thus, favoring regulation will be a dominant strategy for 
the regulator. Outcome from cell I (status quo) will result if regulator does not have the ability to 
force regulation on transporters without their acceptance. Outcome from cell IV will result if it 
can do so. This is a situation of direct confrontation between the parties. The relative political 
strength of the regulator and the transporters will be the main variable in determining the final 
outcome. 
 
Cooperation With the Regulator 
 Let's now assume that the transporter knows that it cannot prevent regulation to be 
introduced. Now, the option “not regulate” does not exist anymore. Then, the question arises for 
the transporter whether it is best served by continuing making a maximum amount of difficulties 
for the regulator or if it is better to make an interplay with the authorities in order to design a 
regulatory regime that is favorable. This is known as a principal/agent problem, in which the 
agent tries to take control of his/hers principal and traps the regulator to act according to it's 
desires (Binmore 1992: 526-530). In this situation, when the transporter continues to resist and 
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the regulator nevertheless intervene, the outcome are the same as in the previous game, as 
depicted in cell IV in figure 22.  
 
 The transporter knows that the 
best result he can expect by opposing a 
new system is of value 1 (cell IV), 
because the regulator certainly will now 
introduce regulation (cell I will not be 
possible). However, by participating in 
the regulatory process, in stead of only 
opposing it, the transporter might 
succeed in achieving a value at least as 
high as when opposing regulation, even 
though it will still be lower than if no 
regulation is introduced, set to value 2 in 
cell III. By doing this, the outcome for the regulator (consumers) may simultaneously be reduced 
to less than if the transporter only adheres to regulator initiatives set to value 1. (On the other 
hand, when transporters participate in the regulatory process, better solutions can be found than 
if the regulator shall figure out all details and the outcome for consumers may not necessarily be 
reduced compared to cell IV, value closer to 2). 
Figure 22: Regulation through interplay
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 In this situation, regulator's dominant strategy will still be to regulate, as regulation would 
yield a better outcome for consumers no matter what the transporter does (2 or 1). The 
transporter, however, will change strategy towards collaboration, because it knows that 
regulation cannot be avoided. By participating in the formulation of regulatory mechanisms the 
situation can be improved (value 2 in cell III) compared to opposing it (value 1 in cell IV). 
However, if the transporter considers that regulator will not get such authority, or it can be 
prevented by some means, it will still choose to oppose any intervention, as shown in cell I in 
figure 21. 
 
Pay-off-matrixes for Transporters and the Regulator 
 Transporters may have diverging views on the possibility of introducing a strong 
(enough) regulatory authority in Europe. However, the greater the number of transporters that 
think the regulator (will) get such an authority, the more of these transporters will start to 
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influence regulatory design and, accordingly, increasingly set the premises for each transporter 
resisting. Thus, transporters should form coalitions in order to prevent "too many" others to 
participate in regulatory processes. In this multifirm dilemma, there may be a critical mass of 
firms (weighed with their quantity transported, sunk capital, strategic significance, political 
influence etc) that are needed to do so.  
 
 If we, for simplicity reasons consider transporters acting as one firm towards the 
regulatory authority, the game-theoretic results from this regulatory process can be illustrated in 
a “Schelling-diagram" (Schelling, 1978). On the vertical axis to the left, the utility for the 
transporter, U(T), is measured (by it's profit) while on the vertical axis to the right utility for the 
regulator, U(R), is measured (by consumers' surplus). The horizontal axis between the two 
vertical axes measures the "level of liberalization". To the left, at point A, no liberalization is 
introduced; to the right at point B, the market is completely and perfectly liberalized. This is an 
unmeasurable continuum, but can be thought of as the number of regulatory initiatives; the more 
liberalized, the more interventions by government must take place such as increased competition 
and introduction of increasingly more regulatory details.   
 
 Maximum utility for the transporter is achieved if no regulation is introduced, as 
illustrated in point C.  In this situation, minimum utility for the regulator is attained, as illustrated 
in point A. If regulation is established, and the transporter just follows passively regulator's 
initiatives, maximum utility for consumers is achieved, illustrated in point D.  In this situation, 
minimum utility for the transporter is achieved, as illustrated in point B. Thus, the utility 
possibility curve goes from C to B for the transporters and from A to D for the regulator when 
the market is increasingly more liberalized. The curves' down- and upward directions illustrate 
that more (and efficient) regulation takes increasingly more profit from the transporters and gives 
it to consumers. Maximum regulatory utility (point D) is drawn as greater than the maximum 
utility for transporters (point C). Point D is higher on the right axis than point C is on the left 
axis, because the gain for consumers should be greater than the loss for producers under 
regulation.  
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bFigure 23: Pay-off matrix for a regulatory process
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 The outcomes in figure 23 can be traced back to the games illustrated in figures 21 and 
22.  In figure 21, point C (value 3 for transporter) and point A (value 0 for regulator) represents 
cell I, where no regulation takes place. Cell III is represented by point D (value 3 for regulator) 
and point B (value 0 for transporter). Cell IV yields outcomes somewhere between C and B for 
transporters (value 1) and A and D for consumers (value 2). By opposing regulation, the 
transporter may succeed in either preventing it from being established, or to maintain some of it's 
profit. This will simultaneously reduce the effect for consumers and is illustrated by the vertical 
line aa. Thus, under our assumptions, the line aa represent the worst outcome for transporters 
(value 1) when conflict with the regulator is chosen, and the best possible outcome for 
consumers (value 2).  
 
 If the transporter knows that regulation will be established, it may start to interact with 
the regulator to design the system in a best possible manner for themselves, as discussed under 
figure 22. By doing so, transporter's utility will at least measure value 1. If it really succeeds in 
capturing the regulator, real profit may be increased almost back to a monopoly level (point C). 
The vertical line bb illustrates a situation where the transporter has managed to regain most of its 
profit, but not all, through this interplay. Transporter's outcome is somewhere between 1 and 3, 
or value 2, while regulator's outcome simultaneously is reduced from value 2 to 1.  
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 However, if the transporters could influence regulation in a way that improves efficiency 
as compared to a situation with no interplay with the regulator, there may be Pareto 
improvements in the process. This may happen because regulator's insight into the industry's 
complexity may be limited and partly be depending on transporter's information. Such examples 
can be found in the U.S. regulatory history, where regulator has made inadequate decisions for 
the industry with huge losses in efficiency and resulting stop-and-go-policies. In this case, the 
utility curve for the transporter will not be a straight line. In figure 24, U(T) is dropping when 
some regulation is introduced. When the transporter starts to interact with the regulator in the 
formulation of new governmental interventions, with a number of market interventions from the 
regulator it manages to maintain its profit without reducing the benefit for the 
regulator/consumers.  
 
Figure 24: Pay-off matrix if the pipeline can 
improve regulatory efficiency
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 This is due to the fact that it can suggest arrangements that are more efficient than the 
regulator could do itself. Overall surplus in the market is increased compared to the more static 
first strategy. At some level of liberalization, illustrated by the line cc, transporters may start to 
suffer again, regulatory interventions are so comprehensive that transporter's utility curve drops 
more steeply down to point B. The transporter would loose so much by passing cc, that it starts 
to oppose regulation again. In this situation, it is possible that the best point for the regulator 
could never be reached, because he lacks the ability to liberalize the market perfectly in an 
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efficient manner and, thus, needs the collaboration from the transporter. By trying to move the 
transporter all the way to point B, the outcome for consumers may be worse than if stopped at cc. 
Thus, utility for regulator may drop if more regulation is introduced. 
  
 The two ways the utility curves are drawn are just examples on their many possible 
natures. They may be bowed in various ways or even be discrete. The most important 
information we can get about transporter strategy from this analysis, independent of the shape 
of the curves, is that it depends heavily on whether a regulatory authority gets the power and 
have ability to liberalize the market or not. The transporters should adopt a dual strategy 
opposing any initiatives taken by authorities on market intervention and simultaneously 
prepare for interplay in designing optimal regulatory regimes, if or when they come. 
Transporters will be best served if they succeed in delaying or destroying political decisions 
giving such power to regulatory authorities, pointing out the complexity of regulations, 
security issues, risk or any other arguments that work. But when or if a decision about actual 
regulation is made, nevertheless, transporters should shift partly to a collaborative strategy. 
The regulator should try to penetrate a possible collaboration between transporters by starting 
to design regulatory regimes with only one or a few of them. If a critical mass of transporters 
interact, the rest must follow, as well.  
 
 In the dynamics of this decision making process, the strategies may shift from conflict to 
elements of cooperation, and back. When and how the parties should or would collaborate and 
when they confront each other, depends on the shape of the curves. The shape depends on 
market complexity, competence among each party, ability to intervene etc. If one accepts that it 
is difficult to reach a fully and perfectly liberalized market, one should rather discuss what would 
be the optimal degree and form for regulation, not only in the sense of economic efficiency, but 
also in terms of political feasibility (cc) 
 
 Of course, the highly stylized description of a completely liberalized market and possible 
intermediates misses a lot of other information that may be important. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to identify segments where competition may be introduced and in which segments 
regulation is necessary in order to assess liberalization. This also identifies why and where 
economic rent is collected in today's gas market. This may be of interest for each party in the 
market if liberalization actually should take place. Firms may have an interest in liberalization, if 
they can be assured that it is confined to those areas that serve their interests. Ceteris paribus, 
transporters may be interested in more competition among producers and customers, producers 
may be interested in lower tariffs to transporters, LDCs may be interested in more competition 
among producers and free access and low tariffs to transporters and so on.  
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5. Alternatives to Regulation 
 
Public Ownership / Changing Property Rights 
 An unregulated transmission company is behaving monopolistically because its owner 
has an interest in maximizing profit. By changing it's property rights, the new owners may have 
other goals. If the owner has, for example, overall efficiency in society, or maximum profit in the 
distribution or production sector, as a goal, profit maximum in the pipeline may not be in the 
owners' interest.  
 
 One way to change property rights is to socialize the firm by changing its ownership 
from private to public. In Europe, this has, until recently, been a quite usual way of approaching 
the problem for a wide range of branches, such as coal, electricity, railroads, post, 
telecommunication, defense industries, steel, shipbuilding, buses, airports, water and gas. The 
idea has been that the problems of monopoly power, externalities, inequality etc. can be dealt 
with directly if they are run with social welfare as goal rather than private profit. 
 
 Nationalization has been argued for both on ideological grounds and because of the 
market failures natural monopolies create. In Europe, labor parties have mostly favored 
nationalization, advocating that ownership of means of production; distribution and exchange 
should be common. The early advocates of nationalization in the 1930s and 1940s hoped that the 
old class antagonism between workers and owners of businesses should be broken down. 
Nationalization should be one means of rectifying the injustice in income distribution between 
consumers and producers and across classes, when huge firms exploit their monopoly power. 
However, there has been considerable debate through the twentieth century on how much of a 
nation's industry should be under public ownership and how much should be managed trough 
market mechanisms (as the “Austrian school”).  As we have discussed, “untouched" natural 
monopolies often do create inefficiencies in markets, restrain economic growth and lead to an 
unfair distribution of rent, between producers and consumers and throughout the gas chain. The 
question arises whether nationalization is superior to regulation or whether some other means 
should be used to repair for the deficiencies.  
 
 One major argument for the privatization of publicly owned enterprises over the past 20 
years, has been their relatively poor economic performance. Obviously, that these run a deficit, 
and not a profit, is a non-valid argument. The nationalized industry should in many cases run a 
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loss if prices are set equal to marginal costs and average costs are falling, as discussed for 
example in figure 8). Therefore, the assessment of nationalized industries should rather be done 
on the basis of its costs and quality of service than on it's profit. Because such comparisons are 
rather difficult17, especially for natural monopolies without competitors, it will not be possible to 
observe such differences with certainty before they become rather significant.  
 
 Another argument in favor of privatization has been that private firms will be more 
exposed to market forces than the publicly owned own one. Privatization should improve 
efficiency, reduce costs, and improve quality and lead to greater responsiveness to the wishes of 
the consumer. However, if a national firm is privatized in a non-competitive market or some 
other regulatory mechanism are introduced, a private monopolist should not have much more 
reason to behave more efficiently than the public one.18 Thus, in most such cases, privatization 
must be followed by some sort of regulation should efficiency be improved. Ownership may be 
only one determinant for the efficiency in an industry, while the degree of competition is another. 
Also public enterprises can be more efficient if they face competition.  
 
 Whether publicly or privately owned and run, transporters in the (non-competitive) 
European gas market must be followed closely by public authorities, which under whatever 
approach will need independent competence and will to take a stand to the number of issues that 
arises. The nationalized industry may lax efforts to improve if government always is ready to 
increase subsidies when they run larger deficits. A private industry can do the same if regulations 
are not followed in an optimal manner. Tough hands are often needed both on the amount and 
the way subsidies are given and how regulations are enforced, including incentive-type 
regulations. Thus, the government's attitude, competence and political standing may in many 
situations be as important as the principles that it adheres to.  
 
Market Forces versus Regulation 
 Competitive markets should ensure entry of new firms on equal terms as the incumbent 
firm. Firms should have costless exit; if a firm wants to leave business it could sell all it's capital 
minus depreciation costs. The latter is rarely the case in the gas industry. For example, the ex 
                                                 
    17 See for example Meyer(1975). 
    18 The main exception is perhaps that the private firm would not have to frequently adjust their targets for political reasons. 
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ante opportunity cost of an investment minus the investment's value ex post are considerable in 
pipelines (the "sunk" costs). Usually the pipes laid cannot be sold for any other purposes than for 
transportation of gas if a company should terminate operations. 
 
 With large sunk costs and economies of scale it is sometimes impossible to build another 
pipeline. If, nevertheless, another company should make the required investments, i.e. in an 
alternative pipeline, the outcome is uncertain. If demand is constant and the incumbent firm 
operates as a strong natural monopoly (average cost are downward sloping over the entire range 
of outputs) it would be no way a new firm could take a share of the market and produce at a 
lower cost. However, if the incumbent firm operates as a weak natural monopoly (where 
diseconomies has occurred at some range, but not sufficiently to make the industry a natural 
duopoly), prices could be forced down, and the new-comer, possibly both, will loose money. 
Thus, competition may be impossible or, if more pipelines enter the market, be destructive for 
both the old line and the newcomer.  
 
 The idea of regulating transporters’ terms of operations is that if the market itself does not 
produce optimal outcomes, then it can be mimicked to do so through regulatory and other public 
instruments. However, no single theory of regulation and regulatory behavior seems fully to 
explain the behavior of regulated firms or lead to first-best outcomes. For this, the issue is far 
more complex than the partial and highly stylized models we have studied. The alternative 
theories are not mutually exclusive and may be used in combination. Cost curves may change 
over time as do demand. The regulatory instruments may include price regulation, profit 
constraints and subsidies. As long as regulators shall 'repair' misallocation of resources with such 
a wide range of instruments, the system may easily end up with outcomes that are either 
overdetermined or have too many degrees of freedom to yield desired results. In a market for a 
strategic and non-renewable commodity as natural gas is, regulatory authorities will easily 
remain an arena of politically oriented interest groups in conjunction with market mechanisms 
and firms operating more or less under competition, within and across borders. To avoid the 
problems faced by the U.S. gas industry, which repeatedly has changed the way of intervening in 
the market place(s) over the century, policy makers should by humble towards the task and take 
an approach that accept some inefficiencies in the market in order to avoid the creation of new 
(and perhaps more serious) ones. 
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 From the outset, the non-competitive structure of the European gas industry indicates that 
today some parties have more power than others do in contract negotiations. The investment 
risks and economies of scope in vertical integration between many of these parties lead to an ex 
post situation, which is relatively inflexible in face of altering market conditions. On the other 
hand, the bundling of services, directly or through long-term contracts, provides assurances for 
the companies involved to sunk investment in production, storage, pipelines and LDCs. If 
unbundling should take place, the access to transportation under terms that is not incurring 
losses, require a dynamic attitude from the regulator. The arrangements done should include a 
variety that suites each actor and segment of the market. These arrangements should be permitted 
to evolve gradually based upon market trends rather than radical change. In doing this, policy 
makers must evaluate the development of market demand in each segment of the market, 
horizontally and vertically, and how firms will respond to these changes.  
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